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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on liquidity risk in capital markets. The main aim is to help practitioners to 
better understand and manage liquidity risk by analyzing the following three topics: modeling 
correlations in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR ( − ) (Chapter Three), impact of regulatory 
interventions on stock liquidity (Chapter Four) and liquidity commonality and option prices 
(Chapter Five). 
 
The first topic focuses on an appropriate way to measure expected stock losses by considering 
liquidity risk (see Chapter Three). The need for a new measure, which also includes stock 
liquidity, is based on the concern of investors only being able to sell stock at a huge discount 
or not at all. In reaction, various papers with new methodologies have been published, 
including the liquidity adjusted Value at Risk ( − ) models proposed by Bangia et al. 
(1998) and Ernst et al. (2012). Based on their approach, we analyze different ways to extend 
these models and to optimize performance. This is done using advanced conditional volatility 
models like  − 	 and  − 
 models and by considering correlations between 
spread and return data. The new model is called correlation and liquidity adjusted VaR 
 −  and shows (based on a five-year observation period) better performance 
compared to the models by Bangia et al. (1998) and Ernst et al. (2012). The models are 
calculated and back-tested using unique data called Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) provided 
by Deutsche Börse. 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 marked the beginning of a financial crisis affecting 
the entire world of finance. This period is characterized by increasing fear of further defaults 
by corporations (including banks) or even by countries. In reaction, investors began shifting 
their assets to more stable and secure investments and this resulted in stock market crashes. 
Various interventions were made by government institutions to restore stability.  
 
The target of the second topic is to analyze the impact of these interventions on liquidity 
(measured by volume-weighted bid-ask spreads) and market reaction (measured by returns) at 
the announcement date (see Chapter Four). In the event, we study abnormal changes of stocks 
listed on the Dax. The interventions which we consider are published by the Federal Reserve 
Bank (FED) in the form of a crisis time-line. Here they are further combined to the following 
  
categories: bank liability guarantees, liquidity and rescue interventions, unconventional 
monetary policy and other market intervention. The results show that, for example, the market 
reacts positively to liquidity and rescue interventions, whereas bank liability guarantees 
reduce liquidity. In addition, we show that international events have a significant impact on 
the domestic market in a "spillover effect". By analyzing the spreads of different traded 
volumes, an asymmetric increase can be detected at the announcement date. 
 
The last topic focuses on the link between equity and option markets (see Chapter Five). 
There we analyze, on one hand, the link between stock market liquidity and option prices and, 
on the other hand, the impact of liquidity commonality in equity and option markets. We can 
show that systematic liquidity (rather than idiosyncratic liquidity) gives a better explanation 
of changes in “at-the-money” implied volatility. This effect was especially strong during the 
financial crisis in 2008. Another result is that liquidity risk of higher traded stock volumes is 
not properly reflected in the option price. This can result in higher hedging costs, as 
mentioned by Certin et al. (2006). To shed more light into liquidity commonality within the 
stock market we calculate the  measure as mentioned by Chordia et al. (2000). The 
results show a continuously changing liquidity commonality which decreases with increasing 
traded volume. This is because the market maker focuses for bigger stock positions more on 
the idiosyncratic liquidity risks while for smaller stock positions the systematic liquidity risk 
is more important. We confirmed our findings with a robustness check. 
  
Contents 
 
Chapter One: 
 General Introduction       01 
 
Chapter Two: 
 Market Liquidity Risk       04 
2.1 Introduction           04 
2.2 The Role of Market Participants, Market Maker, and Regulator   05 
2.3 Definition of Market Liquidity       09 
2.4 Measure and Manage Market Liquidity      11 
2.5 Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM)       14 
 
Chapter Three: 
 Modeling Correlations in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR 19 
3.1 Motivation          19 
3.2 Literature Review         20 
3.3 Econometric Framework        21 
3.3.1 Basic L-VaR Model         21 
3.3.2 Accounting for Heteroscedasticity       23 
3.3.3 Correlation Adjusted  −  Models ( − )    27 
3.4 Back-testing Framework        30 
3.5 Empirical Data Analysis         31 
3.6 Empirical Performance and Discussion      35 
3.7 Conclusion          49 
 
  
Chapter Four: 
 Impact of Regulatory Interventions on Stock Liquidity 51 
4.1 Motivation          51 
4.2 Literature Review         52 
4.3 Event Study Methodology        54 
4.4 Regulatory Events         56 
4.5 Empirical Data Analysis        58 
4.6 Empirical Performance and Discussion      61 
4.7 Conclusion          68 
 
Chapter Five: 
 Liquidity Commonality and Option Prices   70 
5.1 Motivation          70 
5.2 Literature Review         70 
5.3 Empirical Data Analysis        73 
5.4 Empirical Performance and Discussion      77 
5.5 Conclusion          93 
 
Chapter Six: 
 General Conclusion        95 
 
Appendix           98 
1. Appendix for Chapter Three        98 
Table 1.1: Simulation results based on Dax data by using the Kupiec test    98 
Table 1.2: Simulation results based on MDax data by using the Kupiec test   99 
Table 1.3: Simulation results based on SDax data by using the Kupiec test    99 
Table 1.4: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of Dax stocks    100 
Table 1.5: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of MDax stocks   100 
  
Table 1.6: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of SDax stocks   101 
 
2. Appendix for Chapter Four        102 
Table 2.1: Selected events from the FED timeline       102 
Table 2.2: Test results of abnormal spread and return data with fixed volatility   104 
Table 2.3: Test results of abnormal spread and return data with equal volatility   104 
Figure 2.1: Average spread changes of Dax stocks by considering different traded volumes  105 
 
Bibliography          106 
 
 

Chapter One: General Introduction 
 
1 
 
 
Chapter One 
 
General Introduction 
Liquidity is an important factor in financial markets. There are two main types: funding 
liquidity and market liquidity (Dowd K. , 2005). Funding liquidity means that corporates or 
countries are able to fund their liabilities, while market liquidity focuses on asset liquidity. In 
this thesis we will only focus on asset liquidity. 
 
An asset is assumed to be liquid if it fulfills the following criteria: small transaction costs, 
easy trading, timely settlement and that large trades have little impact on market prices 
(Loebnitz, 2006). Under such conditions financial markets are called "sufficient" or "perfect". 
The contrast to that is "illiquidity". This is the case when the investor is not able to sell assets. 
Between liquid and illiquid assets is a gap in which assets can only be sold partly or at a price 
discount. The pressure to liquidate such assets, within insufficient markets, can lead to 
companies collapsing. A frequently mentioned example is the default of LTCM in 1998. This 
hedge fund was managing an undiversified and highly leveraged portfolio, but after a 
financial market fall they were not able to sell concentrated asset positions to cover margin 
calls. As a result the Federal Reserve Bank of New York organized a bailout to avoid a wider 
collapse of the financial markets (Jorion P. , 2000). These kinds of events are rare but can lead 
to a disruption in the global financial economy. However, less liquid assets and the associated 
risk do only appear during crises. Trading strategies and investments with high yield profits 
are invested mostly in less liquid assets such as private equity, emerging markets or low 
capitalized stocks. To manage the risk, investors should always be able to identify the degree 
of liquidity of their assets. 
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Beside the different participants in financial markets, the regulator is also aware of liquidity 
risk. Regulation is established due to the fear that a shortfall by a financial institution or 
corporate can lead to system-wide disruption. For example, banks must ensure an appropriate 
handling of liquidity, including having liquidity measures (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2008). In chapter two we give an introduction to the topic of market risk. There 
the different roles of the market participants, market maker and regulator are defined. 
 
To determine the worst expected loss based on a given level of confidence, a Value at Risk 
(VaR) approach is commonly used (Dowd K. , 1999). This approach is also accepted under 
the new Basel III regulation (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). In general, the 
VaR is calculated on return series and therefore does not capture liquidity risk. Due to this 
deficit, several research papers have been published recently on how to integrate liquidity risk 
into the VaR methodology. In chapter three we give both an overview of different liquidity 
adjusted VaR methodologies and we show ways to improve existing measures. 
 
The financial crisis in 2008 was characterized by increasing fear of further defaults by 
corporations, such as banks, or even by countries. In reaction, there was a “flight to liquidity” 
as investors began to shift their assets to more stable and secure investments. As a 
consequence market prices dropped and liquidity dried up. In these instances, investors are 
less willing to invest in certain securities, even when the price is low. This leads to various 
interventions by government institutions to restore stability. In chapter four, we analyze the 
impact of these interventions on liquidity (measured by volume-weighted bid-ask spreads) 
and market reaction (measured by returns) at the announcement date, focusing on stocks listed 
in the Dax. The test scenarios of the event-study consider: bank liability guarantees, liquidity 
and rescue interventions, unconventional monetary policy and other market intervention. 
 
Directly linked with equity markets are derivative markets. These markets are important 
because they enable investors to leverage or buy protection for their investments. Our study in 
chapter five focuses on the relationship between stock liquidity and option-implied volatility. 
Firstly, we study which impact stock market liquidity has on implied volatility. Based on 
these results we further analyze if stock market (systematic) liquidity or single stock 
(idiosyncratic) liquidity has the biggest impact on option prices. In the final question, we 
focus on the relationship between stock and option markets during the Lehman crisis in 2008. 
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The chapter structure of the thesis is as follows. In chapter two we give an introduction to 
market liquidity risk. In this context we explain how this risk can be measured and we present 
the advanced Xetra Liquidity Measure which is used in the thesis. The following chapters 
(three, four and five) deal with separate research topics which can be read separately from 
each other. Beside the fact that all chapters deal with the topic of stock market liquidity, the 
different perspectives result in separate conclusions for each chapter. A general conclusion of 
the thesis can be found in the last chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Market Liquidity Risk 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Liquidity is an important factor in financial markets. This thesis focuses on liquidity from a 
practical point of view. The intention is to increase the understanding of liquidity risk and 
therefore help to improve risk management systems. 
 
The classical financial market theory is based on several assumptions which reduce the 
complexity of the financial system. Two common examples are that markets are 
“frictionless” and competitive. Frictionless markets are assumed to have no trading costs (e.g. 
taxes or fees) and no restraints on transactions (e.g. short-selling bans). A competitive market 
assumes that a trader can buy or sell an unlimited amount of securities at any time without 
this transaction altering the price. These assumptions are not valid in the financial markets 
and result in various risks (Çetin, Jarrow, & Protter, 2004). In this thesis we focus on liquidity 
risk. 
 
In general, liquidity can be subdivided into funding liquidity and market liquidity (Dowd K. , 
2005). Funding liquidity means that corporates or countries are able to settle obligations 
immediately when required. If this is not possible the debtor is said to be insolvent. The risk 
of not being able to settle future obligations is defined as funding liquidity risk (Drehmann & 
Nikolaou, 2013). In contrast to that, market liquidity deals with asset liquidity. Here the focus 
is on marketability and the ease of trading a security (Longstaff, 1995). Liquidity risk appears 
when the seller has problems unwinding market positions, often at a discount. In this thesis 
we will only focus on asset liquidity. 
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The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section (2.2) we introduce some 
fundamentals of financial markets. Then in section 2.3 we deal with different definitions of 
market liquidity including the one which we use in this thesis. In section 2.4 we demonstrate 
how liquidity can be measured and managed. A specific focus is on the advanced Xetra 
Liquidity Measure (XLM) presented in section 2.5. 
 
 
2.2 The Role of Market Participants, Market Maker, and Regulator 
 
A financial market sees exchanges between sellers who have excess capital and buyers who 
need capital. Securities (such as equities) are traded, with funds transferred between the buyer 
and seller. Generally, financial markets have the advantage of relatively easy trading 
conditions partly due to the high number of market participants facilitating fund flows 
(Madura, 2008). Another advantage is that prices are quoted regularly and transparently, 
which finds an appropriate market price for every asset. 
 
Stock markets began with the first tradable stocks issued by joint-stock companies in the 
early seventeenth century, such as the Dutch East India Company founded in 1602. Trading 
companies were given charters by the state to support the colonization process. To fund their 
voyages and larger fleets they issued the first publicly quoted stocks. The shareholders 
received in return a dividend based on company revenue. At the same time, the Amsterdam 
stock exchange was founded to allow continual trading of these shares. The Amsterdam stock 
exchange is considered to be the oldest in the world. In 1795 the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) emerged and became the leading financial market after French troops had invaded 
Amsterdam. The lead changed again in 1914 to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
which benefited from its large size (Wójcik , 2011). More exchanges were established in 
subsequent years. 
 
The Deutsche Börse is located in Frankfurt and was founded in 1992. Initially, trading was 
only possible on the trading floor but this changed in 1997 with the launch of the fully 
automatic trading platform Xetra. This system collects buy and sell orders from market 
participants in a limit order book (LOB). While in the past, a market maker was responsible 
for matching different trades, this is now performed automatically by the system. Beside the 
mentioned matching system there are still market markers in the Xetra system called 
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Designated Sponsors. Their task is to quote prices regularly and to ensure continual trading, 
mainly in less liquid stocks. The Deutsche Börse controls specific requirements such as the 
minimum quote size and maximum bid-ask spread (Deutsche Börse AG, 2012). By using the 
electronic trading platform, the investor is able to trade around 900,000 German and 
international securities. On peak days around 107 million trades are processed. Access to 
Xetra is given to banks, financial services institutions and financial enterprises from EU 
countries, other European signatory states and the United Arab Emirates. Overall, 4,500 
traders from 18 countries are connected (Deutsche Börse AG, 2012). 
 
The people involved in financial markets can be split roughly into two groups: market 
participants and market maker. 
 
The market participant can be a buyer or a seller of a security, for reasons such as speculation 
or hedging. When an investor is on the buy side he requests liquidity, while the seller supplies 
liquidity to the market. Participants who supply the market are called investors or speculators 
and provide the market with capital and therefore with liquidity. On the other side is the 
request (demand) for liquidity to convert securities into cash. 
 
In general, it is not possible for market participants to access the market directly. Therefore a 
market maker is needed; either a broker or a dealer. A broker only executes trades on behalf 
of others for a fee. A dealer buys and sells securities out of their own account, generating 
revenues through the development of inventory (e.g. buy low and sell high). It is also 
common for individuals or firms to act both as broker and dealer (Harris, 2002).   
 
When a security is bought or sold this is usually done at different prices. The bid price is paid 
when a market participant wants to buy and the ask price is paid when a market participant 
wants to sell. Between both prices is a gap called the "bid-ask spread" (or simply the 
"spread"). The spread represents, on one side, possible revenues for the market maker. On the 
other side, it is a compensation for the interim risk of buying and subsequently selling the 
stock to another investor. The risk depends, for example, on current market conditions 
(crisis/no crisis) or the trading volume. Based on different characteristics, the market maker 
will raise or lower the bid-ask spread to be compensated for the risk and to manage his 
inventory (Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyamb, 2002). 
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Financial institutions (like banks) play an important role in the national and international 
financial system. While in the past the main function of banks was to receive savings and 
grant loans, today they have many more product possibilities. The result is a fast growing 
financial industry interconnected via the interbank market (Bank For International Settlemts, 
1983). The risk inherent in this system was demonstrated during the global financial crisis of 
2007/2008. There, several large financial institutions collapsed, banks were bailed out by 
governments and stock markets around the word fell. To avoid worldwide financial system 
collapse, states (thus tax payers) acted as the lender of last resort1 and took over the costs. 
Subsequently, new institutions and rules were created to ensure better regulation. The 
intention is to limit the risk for banks and others to ensure that market shocks can be absorbed 
during market downturns. 
 
A regulatory framework was set up by the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (Basel). 
The first Basel accord (Basel I) was published in 1988 and defined the minimum capital 
requirements for banks. In 2004 the next Basel accord (Basel II) established a three pillar 
concept with minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline 
(figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 The lender of last resort is defined by Freixas et al. (2000) in the following way: "the discretionary provision 
of liquidity to a financial institution (or the market as a whole) by the central bank in reaction to an adverse 
shock which causes an abnormal increase in demand for liquidity which cannot be met from an alternative 
source" 
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Figure 2.1: Three pillar concept of Basel II 
The figure shows the three pillars of the Basel II approach. Financial stability is based on minimum capital requirements, the 
supervisory review process and market discipline. 
Financial Stability 
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III
Minimum capital 
requirements 
Supervisory review 
process
Market discipline
Capital requirements 
for:
- Credit Risk
- Operational Risk
- Market Risk
- Regulatory 
framework for 
banks
- Supervisory 
framework
Disclosure 
requirements for 
banks
 
 
In the first pillar, minimum capital requirements are regulated with the focus on credit risk, 
operational risk and market risk. Credit risk concerns the risk of default by counterparties 
(e.g. borrowers). There are three ways to calculate the required capital: the Standard 
Approach, Foundation Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach and the Advanced IRB 
approach. Which is the most appropriate depends on the size of the bank and the specific 
services they offer. Operational risk is defined as “the risk of a direct or indirect loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external 
events” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2001). The operational risk component 
can be calculated in three different ways: the Basic Indicator Approach, Standard Approach 
and Internal Measurement Approach. Finally, there is market risk when a bank faces 
problems based on changes of market prices. The Value at Risk (VaR) approach is widely 
recommended here. 
 
The second pillar is called Supervisory Review Process. In this, the bank must have an 
appropriate process to assess capital adequacy in relation to the risk profile called ICAAP 
(Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process). The regulator aims to intervene early if the 
bank is not fulfilling its requirements. 
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In the last pillar the roles for market discipline are defined. The institution is obligated to 
disclose information to market participants such as the capital structure, Tier I and Tier II 
capital and the methodologies used to ensure capital adequacy2.  
 
Based on different financial crises in the 20th century, the Basel committee improved the 
regulations and published a new accord in 2010 (Basel III). The focus is on higher capital 
requirements, a new leverage ratio and liquidity ratio. Compared to Basel II the regulator 
requires higher capital to better absorb shocks in the financial system. 
 
 
2.3 Definition of Market Liquidity 
 
Market liquidity risk is mentioned and discussed in several papers. With the increasing 
number of papers, the number of definitions has also increased. 
 
In general there are explicit and implicit costs which have to be paid when financial products 
are traded. Explicit costs are already known before the trade, while implicit costs can only be 
determined after the trade is executed. Examples for explicit costs are trading fees, 
commission and taxes. In this thesis we neglect the explicit costs and define that liquidity risk 
only consists of implicit costs. This is done because the implicit costs represent around 80% 
of overall transaction costs (Krogmann, 2011). 
 
A more general definition is mentioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) where they state 
that liquidity is equal to the “costs of immediate execution”. In their opinion, an investor has 
to make a tradeoff between waiting to get a favorable price or buying or selling the security 
directly. The price for immediacy is represented by the bid-ask spread. These costs are split 
between the buy and sell side. Therefore Amihud and Mendelson suggest that the spread is an 
optimal measure for liquidity. In the same way, Jorion (2006) argues that liquidity costs can 
be neglected given a sufficiently long liquidation time horizon. 
                                                          
2
 Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital are indicator for the banks’ financial strength. The difference between both indicators 
is the way of calculation. For more information see (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). 
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The most common definition determines liquidity by using the following attributes: tightness, 
depth, resilience and immediacy (Hasbrouck & Schwartz, 1988) (Roll, 1984). All four 
attributes have influence on the costs which appear when a stock is sold. 
 
To understand the meaning of tightness and depth in a market see figure 2.2. The tightness is 
defined as the gap between the bid price and ask price. In other words these are the costs 
which are born when a stock is bought and subsequently sold again (roundtrip) (y-axis). In 
contrast, depth focuses on the trading volume (x-axis). It can be seen in the figure that the 
bid-ask spread grows with increasing trading volume. When a higher position of shares is 
sold both tightness and depth must be considered. An example is given in the figure marked 
by the gray area. Here different spreads are available for limited ranges of trading volume. If 
the amount which has to be sold exceeds this range, the next spread with the corresponding 
volume has to be taken. The overall liquidity cost in this example is equal to the gray area. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Structure of a limit order book 
The following figure shows an example of a limit order book. In this different bid and ask prices are listed for which 
investors are willing to buy or sell shares. The difference between both values is the bid-ask spread. Beside the bid and the 
ask price the dimension of the trading volume can also be seen. With increasing volume the spreads increase. (Source 
(Kaserer & Stange, 2008)) 
 
 
 
Chapter Two: Market Liquidity Risk 
11 
 
Trading in the market is a dynamic process. Therefore it is possible for a market to get out of 
equilibrium if more people want to sell than to buy, and vice versa. The attribute resilience 
focuses on this and measures how long it takes to return to a normal situation after a market 
shock. This attribute considers the time dimension in the trading process. 
 
As for immediacy, the time between submission and execution of the order is considered. 
Slow trade execution might have a negative impact on the other three dimensions. 
 
One definition along these lines is mentioned by Ernst et al. (2009). The difference is in the 
assignment of a cost function which is equal to the sum of different attributes. The advantage 
for an investor is that by transferring the risk dimensions into a cost framework it becomes 
more intuitive. The function is: 
 
Lq 	= 	Tq 	+	PIq 	+	Dq                                     (2.1) 
 
Where Tq is the explicit cost of trading (fees, commissions, taxes, etc.). The parameter 
PIq is the price impact and Dq captures delay costs for an order quantity	q. The 
difference to the before mentioned definition is that PIq combines tightness and depth of 
the market. Resilience is equal to the delay costs.  
 
In this thesis we focus on the liquidity costs which appear when a stock position is sold 
directly in the market. Therefore we neglect the explicit liquidity costs	Tq, which are 
already known before the trade, and delay costs	Dq, which are subject of another topic 
called optimal execution models. Based on that, the question is now in which way PIq can 
be measured. The following section deals with this topic. 
 
 
2.4 Measure and Manage Market Liquidity 
 
The ability to measure liquidity is the key to preventing losses. In general, financial 
institutions or private investors should aim to have a diversified portfolio. But even here, the 
diversification effect can be neutralized by illiquidity (e.g. during a crisis). Therefore 
continuous liquidity risk management is necessary. On several occasions in the past, 
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companies have failed due to market liquidity problems, including the hedge funds LTCM or 
Amaranth Advisors. 
 
The LTCM hedge fund used complex mathematical models in the fixed income market to 
make arbitrage trades. Because of the small income received from each trade they had to use 
a high degree of leverage to maximize returns. The fund collapsed after being hit by the 
Russian financial crisis of 1998. Because of an undiversified and highly leveraged portfolio, 
the hedge fund was not able to sell concentrated asset positions to cover margin calls (Jorion 
P. , 2000). 
 
A similar pattern can be found by looking at the collapse of the multi-strategy hedge fund 
Amaranth Advisors in 2006. At its peak, the hedge fund had around USD 9.2 billion assets 
under management, but they were highly concentrated in natural gas futures. Within one 
week the net asset value decreased by around 65% (Till, 2008) resulting in the biggest loss 
ever made by a hedge fund. Ultimately, the fund was forced into liquidation. Based on a 
detailed analysis by Chincarini (2007) one can see that the fund faced extreme liquidity and 
market risk. 
 
Beside hedge funds, banks also offer services which are exposed to liquidity risk. An 
example is collateralized lending where a client is granted a loan backed by securities. When 
a client is not able to repay the loan, the securities are sold. If the liquidation value is lower 
than the exposure the result is a loss for the bank. A reason for that can be illiquidity in the 
specific market. With a diversified loan book this is generally not a fundamental problem. 
However, it can become critical during times of crisis where many actors have difficulty 
repaying loans. This can result in losses which have to be absorbed by the bank. 
 
In general, financial institutions are motivated to manage market liquidity. To ensure this is 
done in an appropriate way, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (Basel) created 
regulations which oblige banks to identify, measure, monitor and control liquidity risk (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). These are minimum standards which are applied 
by each individual bank. 
 
One common measure for risk is the Value at Risk (VaR) approach (Dubil, 2003). The VaR 
determines the maximum expected loss based on a probability level and a time horizon. This 
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methodology is also accepted by the regulator in the advanced approach to calculate capital 
requirements (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005). Without any doubt, 
simplicity is the main advantage of this methodology. On the other side, the main criticism is 
that the VaR is not a coherent measure3 and expectation for the future is based on data from 
the past. Furthermore the basic VaR methodology assumes that the underlying data are 
distributed normally (Wolke, 2008). 
 
While in the next chapter liquidity adjusted VaR methodologies are presented, in this section 
we want to continue to analyze which kind of pure liquidity measures are available.  
 
In various papers different liquidity measures are proposed. To determine which one should 
be favoured and what are the differences, we focus on the different measures' characteristics. 
According to Houweling et al. (2003) they can be separated into direct and indirect measures. 
The direct liquidity measures focus on bid-ask spread data or on the limit order book. As 
mentioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) the bid-ask spread is the best measure for 
liquidity. Different papers are published for example by Bangia et al. (1999) and Ernst et al. 
(2012) where they confirm the quality of the measure. This is because the bid-ask spread 
reflects the costs for immediate execution of a transaction in the market. In contrast to this, 
the limit order book contains future information of non-executed trades. Compared to the bid-
ask spread of the last executed trade4 the limit order book also contains spreads for higher 
traded volumes. Papers which use weighted spread data are published by Francois-Heude and 
Van Wyendaele (2001), Giot and Grammig (2006) and Ernst et al. (2009)5. 
 
Indirect liquidity measures are proxies for the direct liquidity measures. These can be, for 
example, number of transactions or traded volumes, as mentioned by Berkowitz (2000) and 
Cosandey (2001). The issues surrounding indirect measures are discussed by Krogmann 
(2011). One problem is that they only focus on the past. Another is that they do not 
differentiate between liquidity and, for example, market activity. So, the transaction volume 
may be misleading if a few very large transactions give the impression of a liquid market. 
 
                                                          
3
 A coherent risk measure is defined to fulfill the following criteria: Monotonicity, sub-additivity, homogeneity 
and translation invariance. For more information see (Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, & Heath, 1999). 
4
 In the paper by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) they focus on bid-ask spreads of executed trades. These are 
normally trades for marginal amount of shares and therefore neglect the risk of higher traded volumes. 
5
 In section 2.5 we will give an introduction into this advanced liquidity measure. 
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Based on the above-mentioned advantages we have decided to ignore indirect liquidity 
measures and focus on the direct. Special focus is on the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) 
which is calculated based on the limit order book. This measure contains volume-weighted 
bid-ask spreads. An introduction and definition can be found in the following section. 
 
 
2.5 Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) 
 
The Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) is a direct liquidity measure which is calculated using 
the electronic limit order book (LOB). This measure contains volume-weighted bid-ask 
spreads for different traded volumes and is provided daily by the Deutsche Börse. The XLM 
is denoted in basis points (bps) and is a measure for the cost of buying and subsequently 
selling a stock (round trip). An advantage of the XLM is that the costs of a round trip are 
calculated based on different quantities	. These amounts can be different for the Dax, MDax 
and SDax. Overall the XLM is provided for 10 traded volumes which can be found in table 
2.1 for Dax, MDax and SDax.  
 
The XLM is calculated for a trading volume q at time   in the following way: 
 
XLMq, t = %&'(∑ *+,,-+,,+ .∑ /0,,-0,,0 12345,6 	7 ∗ 10,000                            (2.2) 
 
In this formula ;< and = are bid and ask prices for limit order volumes >< and >= . The 
formula can be simplified in the following way: 
 
?@ = 2AB45.2ACDE2345                                                 (2.3) 
 
Where FG<H contains the volume-weighted bid prices and FIJK contains the volume-
weighted ask prices. When the XLM measure is, for example, 10 bps by considering a traded 
volume of EUR 25,000 of a company the costs of a round trip is equal to EUR 25. 
 
The costs of liquidation are, by assuming a symmetric limit order book, equal to half of the 
bid-ask spread. 
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LM 	NO	PQR S = TUVAW                                                     (2.4) 
 
In this paper we use XLM data for an observation period of 5 years and different indices 
(namely Dax, MDax, SDax). The problem of liquidity measures, which do not consider 
trading volume, is that the volume effect is a significant part of the overall transaction cost 
(Kaserer & Stange, 2008). This can be seen in figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 where the average Dax, 
MDax and SDax XLM spreads for different traded volumes are presented. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Average XLM spreads for stocks listed in the Dax 
The figure shows average XLM spreads for the Dax index by considering different traded volumes. The spreads are in bps 
and have to be paid when a stock is bought and subsequently sold again (roundtrip). The traded volumes are in 1,000 EUR. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the average XLM spreads of the Dax by considering different traded 
volumes. An extreme volatile period starts around the Lehman crisis in October 2008 until 
the end of 2009. During that time an asymmetric increase can be seen by comparing the 
reaction of lower and higher traded volumes. Keeping in mind that we are talking here about 
Germany's blue chips, spreads increase dramatically. This is the risk which, for example, a 
hedge fund has when it is concentrated in stocks with liquidity problems. A margin call 
combined with the need to liquidate assets can result in huge losses. Table 2.1 shows a 
statistical analysis of the spreads over the total observation period. The results for the Dax 
show extreme increases not only for the average spreads but also for the standard deviations 
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with increasing trading volume. To get a better understanding how the data are distributed, 
the average skewness and average excess kurtosis are also presented. For a normal 
distribution, both parameters are equal to 0. In contrast to that, the skewness and excess 
kurtosis of the spreads with respectively 2 and 6 show an extreme behavior. These values are 
rising with increasing trading volume and decreasing slightly after EUR 2m are traded. At 
maximum, skewness is close to 3 and the excess kurtosis around 8. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Statistical analysis of the XLM for stocks listed in the Dax, MDax and SDax 
The following table shows a statistical analysis of the average XLM data (in bps) for Dax, MDax and SDax over the total 
observation period. The table is based on the data presented in figure 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. 
 
Traded Volume* 25 50 100 250 500 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 
Dax 
mean 8.54 9.95 12.77 21.01 34.31 59.43 108.49 159.79 207.03 249.00 
SD 2.94 4.08 6.33 12.99 24.44 47.54 99.50 155.18 192.56 221.60 
Skew 2.22 2.33 2.40 2.55 2.63 2.75 2.94 2.85 2.62 2.57 
Kurt 5.71 6.02 6.29 7.01 7.02 7.32 8.34 7.73 6.50 6.28 
Traded Volume* 10 25 50 75 100 150 250 500 750 1.000 
MDax 
mean 30.23 39.13 54.34 69.15 83.90 114.04 179.15 357.42 474.12 560.45 
SD 10.86 17.41 28.18 38.44 49.06 73.14 132.73 321.76 374.72 406.65 
Skew 1.59 1.96 2.15 2.23 2.31 2.45 2.53 2.42 2.35 2.53 
Kurt 2.88 3.70 4.20 4.57 5.05 5.95 6.16 4.98 5.10 6.54 
Traded Volume* 10 25 50 75 100 150 250       
SDax 
mean 86.56 120.76 177.86 259.23 327.72 489.71 651.54       
SD 30.73 55.77 116.78 201.56 282.52 413.76 486.01 
Skew 1.98 2.64 2.85 2.60 2.45 2.24 2.16 
Kurt 5.67 10.04 10.91 7.32 5.94 4.64 4.48       
* Traded volume in 1,000 EUR 
 
 
In the following figure (2.4) we focus on average spread data of the MDax. When comparing 
the Dax and MDax figures they seem similar. Both have relatively flat pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods while during the crisis there are very high spreads. Also the asymmetric 
increase of the spreads with increasing trading volume can be seen. Beside the common 
characteristics, the difference is based on the gap between the spreads (y-axis). This can be 
seen in table 2.1. The mean spreads of the MDax for a lower trading volume (25,000 EUR) is 
around 4.6 times higher compared to the Dax spreads (25,000 EUR). For higher traded 
volumes, the values get slightly closer to a factor of around 2. Beside the increase of the 
average spreads the standard deviation also increases much more with increased trading 
volume. By comparing the results listed in table 2.1 it must be considered that the traded 
volumes for both indices are different.        
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Figure 2.4: Average XLM spreads for stocks listed in the MDax 
The figure shows average XLM spreads for the MDax index by considering different traded volumes. The spreads are in bps 
and have to be paid when a stock is bought and subsequently sold again (roundtrip). The traded volumes are in 1,000 EUR. 
 
 
 
 
In figure 2.5, we present the average SDax spreads. To exclude excessively extreme values 
we focus on 7 out of 10 trading volumes. The same pattern can be seen when comparing the 
shape of the SDax with that of the Dax and MDax. The difference is clear when looking at 
table 2.1. For a trading volume of 25,000 EUR, the average spread (standard deviation) of the 
SDax is around 3.9 (5.1) times higher and for a trading volume of 250,000 EUR it is 3.63 
(3.66) times higher compared to the MDax. By comparing the maximums in figures 2.3, 2.4 
and 2.5 we can see that for the Dax the value is around 1,400 bps, for the MDax around 2,500 
bps and the SDax shows more than 3,000 bps.  
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Figure 2.5: Average XLM spreads for stocks listed in the SDax 
The figure shows average XLM spreads for the SDax index by considering different traded volumes. The spreads are in bps 
and have to be paid when a stock is bought and subsequently sold again (roundtrip). Based on the highly volatile data only 7 
out of 10 trading volumes are presented. The traded volumes are in 1,000 EUR. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Modeling Correlations in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR6 
 
3.1 Motivation 
A common way to control and measure risk is to use the Value at Risk () approach. By 
specifying a confidence level, the risk manager is able to determine a loss threshold which is 
probably not exceeded. In the past, this measure was used mainly to capture market risk. As a 
result of the last crisis where liquidity risk played an important role, several researchers came 
up with models to capture both risks. One possible way is to use a Liquidity adjusted Value at 
Risk ( − ) model. Beside market risk, liquidity risk is also captured by summing the 
individual VaRs. A weakness is that the correlation between both risk measures is neglected 
(Ernst C., 2009). In this chapter a new and more sophisticated Correlation and Liquidity 
Adjusted VaR  −  model is presented. Beside the Pearson correlation coefficient, 
several correlation models like the Constant Correlation (CC) model, EWMA model and the 
Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) model are focused on. The CC and DCC models are 
calculated using the symmetric  − 	 and asymmetric  − 	
 models with 
normal and Student-T distributed residuals. To evaluate the performance, we look at the 
Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) which contains volume-weighted bid-ask spreads. Based on 
back-testing we analyze which model works best.  
 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. First is the literature review in section 
3.2 and then in section 3.3 the econometric framework is set out. Section 3.4 deals with the 
back-testing framework and in chapter 3.5 the empirical data are presented. The results are 
discussed in section 3.6 and we conclude with section 3.7. 
 
                                                          
6
 This chapter is based on the working paper (Busch & Lehnert, 2011). 
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
Liquidity risk in stock markets is discussed extensively and from different perspectives in 
various papers. In general it can be said that two main research areas exist. 
 
The first considers optimal execution models where the focus is on liquidating a stock or a 
portfolio within a given time. The intention is to minimize liquidity costs while maximizing 
the return. This topic is not discussed further in this chapter but for the interested reader we 
refer to Subramanian et al. (2001), Dubil (2003) or Engle (1982). 
 
The second area focuses on measures for liquidity risk. Here the research papers deal with the 
question of expected costs (or losses) for the investor when a stock or portfolio is liquidated 
immediately. To answer this question different attributes (which are assumed to describe 
liquidity) are focused. The common attributes are bid-ask spread data used by Bangia et al. 
(1999) and Ernst et al. (2012), number of transactions and traded volumes used by Berkowitz 
et al. (2000), Cosandey (2001) and weighted spread data used by Francois-Heude et al. 
(2001), Giot et al. (2006) and Ernst et al. (2009). In the paper by Ernst et al. (2009) they 
demonstrate the outperformance of the  −  models based on XLM data. But they accept 
that their model does not consider correlations between bid-ask spreads and returns. In the 
paper by Francois-Heude et al. (2001) a kind of correlation (overestimation of the spreads) is 
considered in the form of a correction term. The idea is to reduce the current bid-ask spread 
by the means of spreads measured over the observation period. The back-testing results 
presented by Ernst et al. (2009) indicate an underperformance of the model. A paper which 
discusses how to calculate a portfolio  by using liquidity adjusted stock prices was 
published by Botha (2008). There he adds the corresponding bid-ask spreads to stock prices 
which result in liquidity adjusted stock prices. These data are used to calculate a portfolio 
 proposed by Markowitz (1952). But they neglect the correlation between spreads and 
returns. 
In several research papers which focus on L-VaR models, unconditional volatility is used. In 
the paper by Stange et al. (2010) the authors detect volatility clustering in the spread and 
return data and therefore use the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average XY@ 
methodology. We found no articles where the usability of advanced volatility models (e.g. 
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GARCH model) or correlation models (e.g. DCC model) are analyzed in combination with a 
 −  framework. 
 
 
3.3 Econometric Framework 
 
3.3.1 Basic L-VaR Model 
 
The basic  −  approach which is used in this chapter is proposed by Bangia et al. (1998) 
and extended by Ernst et al. (2009). An advantage of this approach is simplicity. From a 
practical point-of-view, the methodology is easy to implement and to process. The aim is to 
capture liquidity risk and market risk in one measure: the L-VaR. This consists out of two 
separate VaRs. The first (Z) captures market risk by focusing on the uncertainty of stock 
price changes with the second ([) considering liquidity risk. The result is an expected 
loss threshold which is not exceeded with a given probability over a specified time (Dowd K. 
, 1999).  
 
 −  = \ + J                                                      (3.1) 
 
Summing both risk measures is obviously a special case, because the underlying assumption 
is that the correlation is equal to one7. However, the authors argue that in “adverse market 
environments extreme events in returns and extreme events in spreads happen concurrently” 
(Bangia A. D., 1998). 
 
The loss based on asset returns is defined as: 
 
MM	(∆ 1 = 	 F^ <H,._ ∗ 1 − `ab\6                                          (3.2) 
 
In this formula F^ <H, is the mid-price between the bid price and ask price at time  . The 
continuously compounded log return is defined as O = PS c 2345,62345,6d&e. To consider a stressed 
                                                          
7
 According to Markowitz the portfolio variance of two assets A and B is defined as	>O2W = >OfW + >OgW +2 ∗ if,g ∗ >Of ∗ >Og. By assuming a correlation of one we can write	>O2W = >OfW + >OgW + 2 ∗ >Of ∗>Og = >Of + >OgW. The standard deviation is equal to the square root and results in >O2 = >Of + >Og  
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market, the formula is modified by substituting O with the Value at Risk formula	jO + kl,OmO. 
The parameter j\ is the expected value of the returns and m\ is the standard deviation. The 
expected value of the returns is assumed to be zero. This is a common assumption for log 
returns8. In the paper by Ernst et al. (2009) two extensions are made to improve the basic 
model by Bangia et al. (1998). Firstly, the standard deviation of the returns is calculated by 
using the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) (J.P.Morgan/Reuters, 1996). 
This is done to account for volatility clustering in spread and return data9. The second 
difference is that in the paper by Ernst et al. (2009) the parameter no is calculated using 
Cornish Fisher approximation10.  
 
The Cornish Fisher approximation is a semi-parametric approach for calculating quantiles of 
non-normal distributions. The methodology is a function of the standard normal quantile in 
combination with the skewness and kurtosis (Alexander, 2009).  The fourth order Cornish 
Fisher approximation is defined as  
 
                        zqr =	zr + _s zrW − 1 ∗ γ + _Wu zrv − 3zr ∗ Κ − _vs 2zrv − 5zr ∗ γv              (3.3) 
 
Where zr = Φ._α is the α quantile of the normal distribution. Furthermore the skewness is 
defined as γ = _|∑ },.}~

|_  and the excess kurtosis is equal to Κ = _|∑ },.}~

 − 3|_   
 
Finally the loss based on stressed markets is 
 
\ = 1 − `ab(k,1                                          (3.4)  
 
Liquidity risk is by definition related to the bid-ask spread which is calculated as the 
difference between the bid price and ask price (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). 
 
bO`R	  = M	bOL` −	;R	bOL`                                        (3.5) 
                                                          
8
 In the statistical analysis of the underlying log spread and log return data in table 3.1 it can be seen that this 
assumption is valid.  
9
 A more detailed description of the EWMA model can be found in chapter 3.3.2. 
10
 Instead of using the empirical quantile method which is mentioned by (Ernst C., 2012). There they calculate 
ko,J = [.~  where o is the percentile spread of the last 20 days. 
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If a trader has to sell a stock, in general he will receive half the bid-ask spread below mid-
market price11. The costs for selling are then equal to 
 
M 	N	PQR S	 = 	0,5 ∗ F^ <H 		= 0,5 ∗ (jJ + ko,JmJ	1F^ <H 	               (3.6) 
 
In this formula  =	2CDE,6.2B45,62345,6  and F^ <H, is in the middle between the bid price and ask price at 
time	 . To account for stressed liquidity in the markets  is replaced by the J = jM +
kl,MmM. The parameter jJ stands for the expected spread and mJ stands for the standard 
deviation of the spread. The variable ko,J specifies the confidence level (e.g. 99%). As for the 
returns, so also for the spreads, Ernst et al. (2009) use the EWMA to calculate mJ and the 
Cornish Fisher approximation to calculate	ko,J. They demonstrate that the spreads show 
volatility clustering and a non-normal distribution. Another adjustment of the basic model is 
proposed by Loebnitz (2006). The author mentions that the J should be used in 
combination with the stressed mid-price and not with the current mid-price. The adjustment is 
to replace F^ <H 	with the J which is equal to expl ∗ m\. 
 
The stress loss based on liquidity is defined as 
 
J = 0,5 ∗ (jJ + ko,JmJ	1 ∗ expl ∗ m\                                      (3.7) 
 
By substituting the \ and J in the  −  formula the result is the following formula:  
 
 −  = 1 − `abj\ + no ∗ m\ + 0,5 ∗ jJ + no ∗ mJ ∗ expl ∗ m\                (3.8) 
 
 
3.3.2 Accounting for Heteroscedasticity 
 
One important parameter in financial time series models is volatility. The volatility of return 
and spread series shows characteristics like volatility clustering (Mandelbrot, 1963) and the 
asymmetric response of volatility to changes in the underlying value. There are different 
methods to account for that. Within this section, the Exponential Weighted Moving Average 
                                                          
11
 Buying an asset is normally done _W S above and selling _W S below the mid-market price. 
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(EWMA) model is used as in Bangia et al. (1998) and Ernst et al. (2012). Additionally, we 
focus on more sophisticated models, namely Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH(1,1)) and the model developed by Glosten, Jagannathan and 
Runkle GJR(1,1). The methodologies are extended to model the conditional mean of log 
spreads by using  − 	 and  − 
 models. 
 
The first volatility model we want to introduce is the EWMA model. A characteristic of the 
methodology is that exponential weights are used for the observations. These weights are 
highest for the most recent observation and decrease for older observations. This is done 
using the following formula:  
 
mW = 1 − ∑ <._O.<W<_                                            (3.9) 
 
Where  is called the smoothing constant in the range 0 <  < 1. The parameter OW is the 
squared return. The above-mentioned formula can be rewritten into a recursion which is more 
practical for calculation. 
 
mW = 1 − O._W + m._W                                            (3.10) 
 
In this formula we have two terms. The first 1 − O._W  determines the reaction of a market 
shock on volatility. With decreasing  the reaction on market information in the past is 
increasing. The second term m._W  measures the persistence of volatility. The higher the , 
the longer volatility stays high.  
 
In comparison to the EWMA model, we now want to introduce the GARCH and GJR 
volatility model. The dynamic conditional behavior of a symmetric normal  −
	F,  process is given by the following formula: 
 
 =  + ∑  . +                                          (3.11) 
 
The conditional mean for an  is calculated as the O-th order autoregressive process. 
 
|¡._ =  + ∑ <Z<_ ._                                              (3.12) 
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¢|¡._	~¤0, mW 
 
The volatility of the 	F,  can be calculated by using the following formula: 
 
mW = ¥ + ∑ ¦<m._W2<_ + ∑ l=¢._W§=_                                      (3.13) 
 
Where ¢ denotes the unexpected return (market shock) which follows a process with a zero 
mean and a time varying conditional variance. In the simple form AR(0), the conditional 
mean error process ¢ is calculated as the mean deviation  −  = 	 − ¨ of the expected 
returns within the information set	¡._. The information set contains return data for a 
specified time period. Within this paper the GARCH(1,1) is used: mW = ¥ + ¦m._W + l¢._W . 
The combination of l + ¦ indicates how quickly conditional volatility decreases to 
unconditional volatility (long run volatility). This is a required constraint for stable results of 
	 models. Long run volatility is defined as m¨W = ©_.oª«. The formula of the 
GARCH(1,1) volatility has the following constraints: ¬ > 0, l, ¦ ≥ 0 and l + ¦ < 1. The 
calculation of the parameter l and ¦ is made using the following log likelihood function: 
 
PS¯ = − _W∑ cPSmW + °66
We±_                                            (3.14) 
 
where ¯ denotes the parameters of the conditional variance formula. 
 
In contrast to the above-mentioned symmetric GARCH model, asymmetric models also exist. 
In symmetric GARCH models no differentiation between the impact of positive or negative 
returns or spread changes are made. This is not the case especially in equity markets. It can 
be seen that market volatility increases more after a negative return than a positive return, as 
mentioned by Black (1976) and Cristie (1982). To account for that, different authors have 
proposed extensions of the GARCH model to capture this asymmetric behavior. Within this 
chapter the GJR model by Gloster (1993) is chosen. This model uses a “leverage” parameter 
 which increases the conditional volatility when the last return ¢._ was negative. The model 
is calculated based on the following formula: 
 
mW = ¥ + l¢._W + 1²°6d&³´µ¢._W + ¦m._W                                      (3.15) 
Chapter Three: Modeling Correlation in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR 
 
26 
 
The different parameters are calculated using the same Maximum Likelihood Estimator 
(MLE) which is also used for the symmetric normal GARCH model (see formula 3.14).  
 
Until now, the symmetric normal GARCH and asymmetric GJR model have been presented. 
One weakness of both models is that they assume that the underlying return data are 
distributed normally. In reality, and especially at the time of stressed markets, the return and 
also the spread data have a skewness and excess kurtosis which is different from zero. This is 
because the underlying distributions have heavy tails (leptokurtic). It is mentioned in several 
papers that in reality these data show (especially during times of crisis), more the shape of a 
Student-T distribution (Engle & Bollerslev, 1986) (Lambert & Laurent, 2001). Therefore the 
GARCH(1,1) and the GJR(1,1) models are also calculated by assuming a Student-T 
distribution. The model is changed by using a different MLE. 
 
PS¯ = −∑ ¶PSm + ·ª_W  PS c1 + ¸ − 2._ °66
We¹±_ + ºPS »(¸ − 2¼1.
&
½Γ ¿W
._ Γ ¿ª_W À      (3.16) 
 
One common criterion, which the EWMA and the GARCH model must fulfill, is that the 
underlying data are stationary. One way to change the data to fulfill this requirement is by 
using log changes instead of absolute values. While the bid-ask spread calculations of Ernst 
et al. (2012) are based on absolute values, formula 3.7 must be changed in the following way 
to allow the usability of the GARCH models: 
 
[ = 0,5	 ∗ exp	l ∗ mUÁÂZ ∗ 	jU ∗ `ab(jUÁÂU + lUÁÂUÃ ∗mUÁÂU1              (3.17) 
 
The mean of the absolute spreads μÅ is multiplied by the VaR of the most negative change 
based on the log spreads. By using the Dickey Fuller12 test during the simulations the log 
returns and log spreads displayed stationary behavior overall. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Dickey Fuller test assesses the null hypothesis of a unit root using the model  = L + É + Ê._ +¦_Δ._ +⋯+ ¦ÍΔ.Í + ¢ where Δ =  − ._, b number of lagged differences and ¢ is the zero mean 
innovation process. 	´ is that Ê = 1 and the alternative  Ê < 1 which indicates stationarity. 
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3.3.3 Correlation Adjusted  −  Models ( − ) 
 
There are different methods to measure correlations between two variables. In this section we 
consider the Pearson correlation coefficient and the 	, 
 and XY@ models.  
 
The basic formula presented by Bangia et al. (1999) or Ernst et al. (2012) does not allow a 
calculation of the  − . Therefore the  −  formula 3.8 has to be adjusted. Instead 
of considering the expected loss of returns (formula 3.4) the formula is changed to capture the 
most negative expected change.  
 
\ = ko,\m\                                                (3.18)  
 
In our opinion this can be done because the liquidation value (formula 3.34) is also calculated 
accordingly. 
 
The change of the J formula has already been described in formula 3.17 and is as 
follows: 
J = 0,5	 ∗ exp(l ∗ mUÁÂZ1 ∗ 	jU ∗ `ab(jUÁÂU + lUÁÂUÃ ∗mUÁÂU1 = ko,UmU   (3.19) 
 
To extend formula 3.1, that correlation can also be considered, the basic and well-known 
portfolio  formula presented by Markowitz (1952) can be used. 
 
 −  = Î\W + JW + 2 ∗ iJ,\ ∗ \ ∗ J                    (3.20) 
 
Another change we make is based on the distribution of log returns and log spreads. Figure 
3.1 shows an example of both distributions. It is important to understand that the risks for the 
log spread distribution and log return distribution are contrary. While negative log changes 
have to be considered for the \ (left part of the distribution) the positive spread changes 
have to be covered by the J (right part of the distribution). In Figure 3.1 it can be seen 
that when both risks increase the >OÏÁÂ, MÏÁÂ goes negative. The impact of negative 
correlations on formula 3.2 is that the  −  is decreasing. This is contrary to the 
intention that when both risks are increasing, the correlation term should also increase. 
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Therefore the prefix of the correlation term has to be changed. The target is that when both 
M are moving in the same direction the calculated value should be iJ,\ = 	1 and not 
iJ,\ =	−1.   
 
 
Figure 3.1: Impact of the log return and log spread distributions on covariance and correlation 
The following figure shows that risk is contrarily distributed for spread and return data. While for returns, negative changes 
are critical, for spreads positive changes should be considered. Therefore the correlation between spreads and returns is also 
different. A correlation of -1 indicates that risk is moving concurrently while a correlation of 1 indicates no common 
movement. 
 
 
 
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient is defined as:  
 
iJ,\ = LOOO, M = ÐÁÑ\6,J6D                                         (3.21) 
 
Through the standardization of the covariance the correlation is in the range −1 ≤ iJ,\ ≤ 1. 
By changing the formula the covariance is defined as:   
 
L>O, M = mJ ∗ m\ ∗ iJ,\                                           (3.22) 
 
Changing the formula to matrix notation the result is: 
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 = ÓÓ                                                       (3.23) 
 
Where Ó is a positive definite diagonal matrix of time varying GARCH or GJR volatility 
models. The rest of the matrix is assumed to be zero. The correlation matrix  is not time 
varying and is therefore called the Constant Correlation (CC) model. The matrix  can 
contain any correlations with the condition that the covariance matrix  is positive definite. 
Based on the above-mentioned model, Engle (2000) propose a Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (DCC) where C is time varying. The covariance matrix for log spreads and log 
returns is: 
 
 = »mJ 00 mJÀ »
1 iJ,\iJ,\ 1 À »
m\ 00 m\À                              (3.24) 
 
The volatility mJW and m\W can be estimated by using the GARCH, GJR or the EWMA model 
as described previously in section 3.3.2. The next step is that each return and spread has to be 
standardized by their dynamic standard deviation. 
 
Returns: n\, = \6d&,6d&      Spreads: nJ, = J6d&D,6d&                            (3.25) 
 
The time-varying correlation based on the EWMA methodology can then be calculated as 
follows:  
 
iJ,\ÔÕVf = D,6ÖD,6∗,6                                                   (3.26) 
 
Where the covariance is equal to: 
 
mJ\, = 1 − O\,._OJ,._ + mJ\,._W                                        (3.27) 
 
Within this paper the parameter  is assumed to be 94%13. The matrix notation is: 
 
                                                          
13
 The value is used by Risk Metrics for the daily update of the volatility within the Risk Metrics database. For 
for information see: J.P. Morgan Risk Metrics Monitor, Fourth Quarter 1995. 
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 = 1 − (n\,._n\,._̀ 1 + ._                                  (3.28) 
  
By using the GARCH(1,1) model the correlation is defined as:  
 
iJ\, = iJ\¨¨ ¨¨ + l(n\,._nJ,._ − iJ\¨¨ ¨¨ 1 + ¦(iJ\,._ − iJ\¨¨ ¨¨ 1                   (3.29) 
 
where iJ\¨¨ ¨¨ = X(n\,._n\,._̀ 1 is the unconditional long run correlation. This value can be 
calculated as iJ\¨¨ ¨¨ = _±∑ (n\,._nJ,._1±_ . The matrix notation is: 
 
 = X(n\,._n\,._̀ 11 − l − ¦ + l(n\,._n\,._̀ 1 + ¦._             (3.30) 
 
As in the chapter before, a MLE function is used to find the best solution. For a two-asset 
case, the formula can be expressed as: 
 
Ð =	− _W∑ PS(1 − i\,JW 1 + (\6
½ªJ6½.WØ&½,6\6J61
(_.Ø,D½ 1
±_                              (3.31) 
 
There are different extensions possible for that model. For example Tsay (2006) extended the 
model by assuming that the standardized innovations follow a Student-T distribution. Also he 
introduced asymmetric treatment of the standardized innovations to capture leverage effects 
within the volatility. 
 
 
3.4 Back-testing Framework 
 
To determine the quality of the different  −  models the numbers of exceedances are 
focused upon. If the model has excellent performance, the exceedances of the model should 
be equal to the number of exceedances determined by the confidence level. If this is not the 
case, the reason can be an underestimation (too many exceedances) or an overestimation (too 
few exceedances) of risk. A test that considers this differentiation is the unconditional 
coverage test presented by Kupiec (1995).  
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The Kupiec test assumes that the number of exceedances a follow a binomial distribution 
with the probability	b. Based on the assumption that a model works perfectly, the value 1 − b 
is equal to the confidence level l. In the simulations l is assumed to be 95%. The parameter 
S_ is the number of exceptions, S is the number of days that are considered in the VaR 
calculation and S´ = S − S_ are the days when the VaRs are calculated correctly. Based on 
the parameter the following Likelihood Ratio (LR) test static can be used: 
 
 = −2 ∗ cS_PSl + S´PS1 − l − S_PS Ù&Ù  − S´PS 1 − Ù&Ù e                   (3.32) 
 
In the formula, the LR follows a Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom. By 
assuming a confidence level of 95% the test will be rejected if  < 3.84. The confidence 
level for the test can be chosen independently from the confidence level of the VaR.  
 
In the simulations, the value S is equal to the total observation period. The number of 
exceedances S_ is the sum of Boolean values and is defined as: 
 
S = 	 Ý1	N	 ≤ 0	N	 >                                                  (3.33) 
 
Where  = 1…20 are the number of days in the observation window and 
 
 = PS c2634526d&345e + PS 1 −
_
W ∗ MbO`R                           (3.34) 
 
The price  of a stock which has to be sold at time   is equal to the log return plus the loss 
from liquidity costs (Ernst, Stange, & Kaserer, 2009).  
 
 
3.5 Empirical Data Analysis 
The empirical data in this chapter are from stocks listed either in the Dax, MDax or SDax. A 
time period of 5 years is considered. Due to new listings, de-listing and data quality problems 
not all stocks could be taken for simulation. In the end, 23 stocks of the Dax, 45 stocks of the 
MDax and 23 of the SDax qualified. From these data the stock mid-prices are taken. The 
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weighted bid-ask spreads for different traded volumes are provided by Deutsche Börse. They 
calculate and offer these values daily under the name Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM). The 
XLM is denoted in bps and is a measure of the costs which appear by buying and then selling 
directly a stock ("round trip"). An advantage of the XLM is that the costs of a round trip are 
calculated for different quantities . These quantities can be different for the Dax, MDax and 
SDax. With increasing traded volumes, the XLM data have missing values. In our opinion, 
this is because few or no trades are made daily with this order size. 
 
The XLM is calculated in the following way (Kaserer & Stange, 2008): 
 
XLMq = ß∑ *+-++ - − ∑ /0-00 - à ∗ _´,´´´áâ+ã                                       (3.35) 
 
 
In this formula ;< and = are different bid and ask prices for limit order volumes >< and >= . 
The formula can be simplified in the following way: 
 
?@ = 2ABäå.2ADæçç2345                                                 (3.36) 
 
When the XLM measure is, for example, 10 bps by considering a traded volume of EUR 
25,000, the costs of a round trip is equal to EUR 25.  
 
The intention of the  −  and  −  is to consider the costs which appear when a 
quantity of stocks is sold immediately. Therefore the costs of liquidation are, by assuming a 
symmetric limit order book, equal to the half of the bid-ask spread: 
 
LM 	NO	PQR S = TUVAW                                          (3.37) 
 
A statistical analysis of the underlying return and spread data can be found in table 3.1.  
The return data show a mean of zero and a pretty low standard deviation over all indices. 
Non-normality can be seen by looking at the skewness and excess kurtosis. While both values 
are zero for the normal distribution, the excess kurtosis is particularly different with a mean 
of 11. The results of the MDax and SDax are a bit lower but they still show heavy tails. This 
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result is also achieved by using the Jarque-Bera14 (JB) test. This test measures, by using the 
skewness and kurtosis, the difference to the normal distribution. In the zero hypotheses it is 
assumed that the tested values are normally distributed. In all indices the test was rejected in 
100% of cases (confidence level 95%). 
 
Within the statistical evaluation, not all traded volumes of the log spreads are considered. For 
the Dax, the volume of 50 and 100 thousand and 3 million, for MDax, 50, 100 and 500 
thousand and for the SDax, 25, 50 and 150 thousand are in focus. The log spreads shown in 
table 3.1 also have a mean of zero but with a high standard deviation. The standard deviation 
increases from Dax to MDax and SDax. That the log spreads are also non-normally 
distributed can be seen from the skewness and excess kurtosis. While the skewness is around 
zero, which would imply normality, the excess kurtosis is far from normal. The kurtosis is 
highest for the MDax followed by the SDax and the Dax. Also for the log spreads, the JB test 
confirms the assumption of non-normality.  
 
In the following discussion the impact of different traded volumes on the  − M and 
 − M are discussed.   
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Table 3.1: Synthesis of statistical data of log spreads and log returns 
The table shows a statistical analysis of the underlying log spread and log return data. The indices Dax, MDax and SDax are considered over an observation period of 5 years. 
Additionally to the standard attributes also the Jarque-Bera14 test is performed which indicates if the underlying data come from a normal distribution. 
 
  
Dax (23 stocks) 
 
MDax (45 stocks) 
 
SDax (23 stocks) 
    Mean Median SD Max Min 
 
Mean Median SD Max Min 
 
Mean Median SD Max Min 
Return statistics 
     
 
Mean 0 0 0 0,001 -0,001 
 
0 0 0,001 0,001 -0,002 
 
0 0 0,001 0,001 -0,001 
SD 0,025 0,023 0,005 0,037 0,016 
 
0,028 0,03 0,007 0,038 0,013 
 
0,028 0,026 0,007 0,044 0,015 
Skewness -0,027 0,129 0,456 0,613 -0,902 
 
-0,113 -0,116 0,333 0,451 -1,147 
 
-0,213 -0,203 0,482 0,703 -1,156 
Excess Kurtosis 11,92 10,829 5,085 26,137 6,4 
 
8,41 7,9 3,075 17,646 4,58 
 
10,118 8,858 4,839 23,264 5,815 
JB-test (95%) 100% 
     
100% 
     
100% 
    
 
     
Max. 0,159 0,16 0,034 0,228 0,086 
 
0,16 0,155 0,06 0,287 0,056 
 
0,157 0,151 0,057 0,316 0,072 
Min. -0,156 -0,151 0,046 -0,069 -0,27 
 
-0,166 -0,16 0,062 -0,069 -0,277 
 
-0,173 -0,151 0,074 -0,097 -0,423 
  
 
 
 
 Spread statistics 
  
 
Mean 0 0 0 0,001 -0,001 
 
0 0 0,001 0,002 -0,001 
 
0 0 0,001 0,002 -0,001 
SD 0,187 0,183 0,037 0,285 0,086 
 
0,275 0,276 0,051 0,435 0,143 
 
0,36 0,36 0,058 0,608 0,239 
Skewness -0,047 -0,062 0,131 0,306 -0,446 
 
-0,01 0,004 0,175 0,757 -0,539 
 
0,12 0,131 0,189 0,52 -0,501 
Excess Kurtosis 4,504 4,097 1,377 10,59 3,152 
 
14,192 4,184 31,114 152,718 3,308 
 
7,372 5,241 7,373 52,649 3,272 
JB-test (95%) 94% 
     
97% 
     
97% 
    
 
     
Max. 0,775 0,728 0,242 1,695 0,446 
 
1,445 1,124 0,898 4,924 0,627 
 
1,934 1,793 0,689 3,88 0,868 
Min. -0,827 -0,778 0,27 -0,485 -1,988 
 
-1,431 -1,146 0,897 -0,682 -4,568 
 
-1,791 -1,541 0,771 -0,922 -4,632 
 
                                                          
14
 The Jarque-Bera (JB) test is used to test if data are based on a normal distribution. Therefore the skewness  and kutosis è of the underlying data are focused 
on. The test is calculated with the following formula 
é = Ù.Ks W + _u è − 3W. For large samples, the 
é result is Chi-square distributed with two degrees of 
freedom. 
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3.6 Empirical Performance and Discussion 
 
In the following section the back-testing results of the  −  and new proposed  −  
are discussed. The methodologies used are defined in section 3.3. The performances of the 
different models are evaluated by using the Kupiec test (see section 3.4) with a confidence 
level of 95%. The discussion focuses on the following two main topics which have been 
neglected in other research papers. Firstly, the impact of different correlation models 
compared to the generally made assumption of perfect correlation like in Bangia et al. (1998) 
and Ernst et al. (2012). Secondly, the usability of advanced conditional volatility models like 
AR-GARCH and AR-GJR models compared to the basic EWMA model. 
 
The simulations are calculated using rolling, non-overlapping, time-windows with a length of 
20 days. To get stable results for the GARCH and GJR methodologies a fitting period of 
1,000 days is taken. We applied a cap and a floor to the log returns at 
+2.5 ∗  SROR	Ó`> S and −2.5 ∗  SROR	Ó`> S  before using the GARCH 
models. Based on the limited number of XLM data (approx. 1,320 days) 16  − M and 
 − M are calculated for each stock and index. Based on the low back-testing 
performance by using the Cornish Fisher approximation, the following results are calculated 
by assuming a normal distribution (confidence level 99%). At the end of this section the 
reason for the low performance of the CF methodology is discussed. 
  
In figure 3.2 the overall back-testing results are demonstrated focusing in the Dax, MDax and 
SDax indices for a five year time period. The intention of this figure is to demonstrate the 
increase on the back-testing performance when the correlation is measured and not assumed 
to be perfect, as per Bangia et al. (1998) and Ernst et al. (2012). The performance increase is 
equal to the difference between the “Perfect Correlation” and the corresponding “Dynamic 
Correlation” bars. The “Improvement” line is the difference between the two bars in 
percentage terms. Each bar shows the average back-testing results by considering three 
different traded volumes for each index15.  
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 Traded volume buckets are described in section 2.5 
Chapter Three: Modeling Correlation in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR 
 
36 
 
Figure 3.2: Back-testing results by using different volatility and correlation models 
The figure shows the back-testing results by using Dax, MDax and SDax data. On the y-axis (left) the ratio is visible 
demonstrating in which cases the Kupiec test was not rejected. On the y-axis (right) the improvement between considering 
dynamic versus perfect correlation is visible. The abbreviations in the figure are as follows: G_G: GARCH with Gaussian 
residuals, G_T: GARCH with Student-T residuals, GJR_G: GJR model with Gaussian residuals, GJR_T: GJR model with 
Student-T residuals. 
 
 
 
 
In general, it can be seen in figure 3.2 that all models show better performance when the 
correlation is not assumed to be perfect (OO`P S < 1). The relative improvement over 
all indices is around 1% to 22%. By focusing on each index individually the results show the 
following ranges of improvement: Dax 3% to 13%, MDax 1% to 14% and SDax 7% to 22%. 
In the paper by Bangia et al. (1998) they argue that at least during crisis, a correlation of one 
is realistic. Given that within our simulation windows a huge crisis took place (e.g. the 
default of Lehman Brothers end 2008, see figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5) the results show this 
assumption is not valid. A better performance can be achieved by considering dynamic 
correlation models like the DCC and EWMA approach. In a later stage of this discussion a 
more detailed analysis of the correlation results and models will take place. 
 
The back-testing results based in the Dax data indicate that the best performance is achieved 
by using the correlation adjusted EWMA (CEWMA) model. The performance increase 
compared to the EWMA model is around 3%. More negative than the CEWMA and equal to 
the EWMA are the results achieved by the correlation adjusted GARCH model (CGARCH) 
with Student-T- or Gaussian distributed residuals. The GJR and correlation adjusted GJR 
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(CGJR) models show the worst performance. By focusing on the results based on the relative 
improvements, the CGARCH model with Student-T distributed residuals shows the best 
performance with an increase of around 13%.  
 
A way to get more detailed information about the back-testing results is to focus on the 
rejected Kupiec tests and to analyze whether risk is over or underestimated. The analysis can 
be found in table 1.1 of the appendix. There it can be seen how for the Dax data the risk is 
never underestimated due to breaches of the L-VaRs. The reason is that the observation 
period contains a huge market shock and therefore the model expects an excessive shock in 
the future. It can be seen that the rejection rate of the test decreases when a correlation model 
is considered. This is based on the fact that the L-VaRs are reduced by considering 
correlations and therefore produce more exceedances. Because of that, the risk is not 
overestimated and the Kupiec test is accepted. By focusing on higher traded volumes, the 
performances of the correlation models increase. The back-testing results show no significant 
improvements within the GARCH and GJR models by using the Gaussian or Student-T 
distribution. The degrees of freedom which are calculated by maximizing the MLE (formula 
3.16) can be found in table 3.2. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Degrees of freedom by using the GARCH and GJR model with Student-T distributed 
residuals 
The table shows the average degree of freedom which is the result of using the GARCH and GJR models with Student-T 
distributed residuals. For the calculation we use the MLE presented in formula 3.13. 
 
  Mean SD Max. Min. 
Dax 
GARCH T Spread 16 20 139 4 Return 17 24 127 6 
GJR T Spread 19 28 191 4 Return 18 26 131 6 
MDax 
GARCH T Spread 13 14 149 3 Return 11 8 55 5 
GJR T Spread 14 15 147 3 Return 12 9 55 5 
SDax 
GARCH T Spread 12 20 157 3 Return 5 1 7 3 
GJR T Spread 13 20 160 3 Return 5 1 7 3 
 
 
By comparing the simulation results of the Dax with the one of the MDax it can be seen that 
the GARCH and GJR models show a better performance compared to the EWMA model by 
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assuming a perfect correlation. The highest result is achieved by the GJR-T model. In 
contrast to that have the CGARCH-G, CGARCH-T and the CEWMA model the best results 
by considering a dynamic correlation. While the EWMA model has the most negative 
performance, this is changed by using the CEWMA model which is among the best. The 
detailed analysis of the back-testing result (Appendix: Table 1.2) is close to that of the Dax. It 
can be seen that (especially for higher traded volumes) risk is switching from overestimation 
to underestimation when correlation is considered. To get an impression of the impact of the 
different VaR components figure 3.3 has been created. The different components are 
combined in formula 3.20 to get the  − 16. The example is based on the Deutsche Bank 
stock listed in the Dax. Here it can be seen that the VaR of the log returns has the biggest 
impact, followed by the VaR of the log spreads. The correction factor based on the 
correlation is pretty small at around 1%. Anyway, the increasing back-testing results indicate 
the positive impact. By comparing the results of the different traded volumes it is visible that 
the performance for the first two is more or less stable, while for the highest volume a 
decrease can be seen. This is based on the increased impact of the bid-ask spreads (see figure 
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). By analyzing the degree of freedom for the GARCH-T and GJR-T model, 
the results in table 3.2 indicate that the values for the returns are decreasing compared to the 
results of the Dax while the spread values stay constant. The result is an increase of the back-
testing performance as demonstrated in figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Compared to formula 3.20 the chart just focuses on the following three components while neglecting to 
calculate the root of the sum. VaR Return: \W, VaR Spread : JW, Corr. adjustment: 2 ∗ iJ,\ ∗ \ ∗J 
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Figure 3.3: Portion of the VaR return, VaR spread and the correlation term by subdividing the L-VaR 
In the figure the portions are demonstrated which each single component of formula 3.2017 has of the total L-VaR. The 
components are ëì, ëìí and the common term î ∗ ïð,ñ ∗ ñ ∗ ð. The figure is calculated by focusing on the Dt. 
Bank stock and a traded volume of 3m EUR. The calculation is done for each of the 16 observation windows. 
 
 
 
 
The back-testing based on the SDax are in general lower compared to the Dax and MDax. 
The best performance is reached through the GARCH-G and GJR-G model considering 
correlations. The improvements based on the correlations are 20% and 22%. These are the 
highest results recorded within the whole back-testing. In contrast to that, the best 
performance is achieved with the GARCH-T and GJR-T model, by assuming a perfect 
correlation. While the EWMA and CEWMA show constant good performance in the DAX 
and MDax back-testing, the results for the SDax are among the worst. The reason can be seen 
in the detailed analysis (Appendix: Table 1.3). Here the EWMA model overestimates the risk, 
while by considering correlations it turns into an underestimation. That indicates how the 
impact of the correlation adjustment is too high. By comparing the results based on traded 
volumes it can be seen that overall performance decreases with increasing traded volumes. It 
can be seen that by comparing these results with the ones of Dax and MDax, the models' 
performance decreases with declining index market capitalization. The bid-ask spreads show 
a much higher impact on small rather than big indices, as can be seen in figures 2.3, 2.4 and 
2.5. The results of the calculated degree of freedom (table 3.2) show the same development as 
                                                          
17
 The square root is not considered in this figure. 
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already mentioned for the Dax and MDax. While the value for the returns is decreasing again, 
the results for the spreads are more or less stable. The detailed analysis shows that the back-
testing results based on the Student-T distribution are always better than by using the normal 
distribution. 
 
The question which then occurs is: which correlation is most effective for achieving the 
highest back-testing results? Therefore, in figure 3.4 theoretical correlations are used for the 
simulations. In this example, volatility is calculated by using the GARCH model with 
Gaussian residuals. The results show that the best performance is achieved by using different 
correlations for each index. An optimal performance is achieved with a correlation of 10% 
for the Dax, 30% for the MDax and 30% to 50% for the SDax. This indicates that a 
correlation of one results in an overestimation of risk. Overestimation is increasing with a fall 
in the index capitalization. Also this chart shows that a perfect correlation leads to a 
significant fall in back-testing performance. 
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Figure 3.4: Back-testing results by using theoretical correlations 
The following figure shows the back-testing results by using formula 3.20 and theoretical correlations. The results are based 
on a GARCH model with normally distributed residuals. For the Dax 3.0m, MDax 0.5m and for SDax 0.15m traded volume 
are focus. 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above-discussed theoretical correlations which indicate the optimal back-testing 
results, we now want to look at the results based on empirical simulations. The average 
correlation can be seen in table 3.3 for each index and traded volume. 
 
 
Table 3.3: Results of the different correlation models for Dax, MDax and SDax 
The table shows the average correlations for the 16  calculations by using different correlation models namely Dynamic 
Conditional Correlation (DCC), Constant Correlation (CC), Exponentially Weighted Moving Average Correlation 
(CEWMA) and the Pearson correlation coefficient. The calculation is done for the indices Dax, MDax and SDax and 
different traded volumes. 
 
Index No. of traded volume* 
DCC CC EWMA_C Pearson 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Dax 
50 -21% 0.075 -20% 0.132 -23% 0.061 -22% 0.125 
500 -19% 0.085 -19% 0.145 -23% 0.07 -19% 0.136 
3,000 -16% 0.087 -15% 0.148 -20% 0.071 -14% 0.141 
MDax 
50 -14% 0.012 -14% 0.008 -16% 0.005 -13% 0.053 
100 -14% 0.011 -14% 0.007 -16% 0.004 -13% 0.046 
500 -12% 0.008 -12% 0.006 -14% 0.004 -10% 0.04 
SDax 
25 -9% 0.005 -9% 0.002 -8% 0.002 -10% 0.028 
75 -9% 0.007 -9% 0.004 -10% 0.002 -9% 0.032 
150 -7% 0.007 -8% 0.003 -10% 0.002 -7% 0.034 
* Traded volume in 1,000 EUR 
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The results of the Dax indicate that among the different correlation models, no big fluctuation 
takes place. They are all at around 20% which shows that they are neither moving very 
concurrently nor independently. It can be seen that the correlation in general decreases with 
increasing traded volume. This is also valid for the standard deviation of the average 
correlation results. We assume that this is based on the fact that for higher traded volumes the 
spreads are already higher and have therefore not so often been adjusted than for smaller 
traded volumes. The comparison with theoretical correlations shows that the results are too 
high to be optimal. The average correlations of the MDax data are smaller compared to the 
one of the Dax. But here also, deviation results are not significant between the different 
models. Another common, but less strong behavior can be seen by looking at the different 
traded volumes. While for the first two traded volumes the results are equal, the highest 
traded volume shows a slightly lower correlation and standard deviation. The last results are 
based on the SDax. By comparing the average results with the results of the previous indices, 
the values are again smaller. This leads to the conclusion that the size of the market has an 
impact on behavior between spreads and returns. Also, the standard deviation decreases 
constantly from Dax to MDax and SDax. This statement is based mainly on the results of a 
trading volume of 50,000 EUR which are available in all three indices. By comparing the 
empirical results with the optimal correlation results (figure 3.4) it can be seen that they are 
contrary. While optimal correlation is increasing, from MDax to SDax the empirical results 
decrease. This shows that there are other factors which cannot be captured by the correlation. 
 
The different VaR methodologies are calculated at the end of the total observation period. 
This is done to achieve stable results. Nevertheless, the different correlation models can be 
calculated continuously over the total observation period. In the following example we focus 
on the Index Dax. To capture the liquidity within the index we calculate a Market Liquidity 
Measure (MLM). This measure is defined as the equally weighted average over all XLM 
spread data of the focused Dax stocks.  
 
@@,Ñ = _Wv∑ ?@<,Ñ,Wv<_                                              (3.38) 
 
Here the variable  stands for each of the 23 stocks which are focused on and   for each point 
in time. The parameter > defines the trading volume. In the same way the equally weighted 
returns are also calculated.  
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¡SRÓa = _Wv∑ O<,Wv<_                                                 (3.39) 
 
In this formula  stands for the stock, O for the periodic return and   for the point in time. We 
do not use the returns of the Dax index, published by the Deutsche Börse, because this 
measure is weighted by the market capitalization of each stock. To be consistent we would 
need to adjust the weights of the spread measure which cannot be performed due to missing 
data.  
 
To create the following three figures, the different correlation models described in section 
3.3.3 are used in combination with the @@ and ¡SRÓa measures. We consider three 
different trading volumes. As well as the DCC, EWMA and CC correlation measure a 20 day 
rolling correlation is also calculated by using the Person correlation coefficient called RW 
(Rolling Window). 
 
The results with a trading volume of 25,000 EUR can be found in the following figure.   
 
 
Figure 3.5: Results of the different correlation models over the total observation period 
In the following chart the result of the DCC, EWMA and CC correlation model is presented. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is calculated by using a 20-day rolling time window named RW. The MLM is calculated by using a trading 
volume of 25,000 EUR.   
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By looking at figure 3.5 we can see that the correlation is negative overall. This shows that 
decreasing returns result in increasing spreads. The interpretation is that when stock prices 
are falling liquidity spreads are increasing. The CC measure is equal to -40%. In comparison, 
the other correlation coefficients show that there is a dynamic in the relationship between 
spreads and returns over time. By assuming a constant correlation this information is 
neglected. This justifies the usability of the advanced correlation DCC and EWMA model 
and the simple RW methodology.        
 
Comparing the dynamic correlation models it can be seen that highest volatility appears using 
the EWMA and the RW correlation. The difference is due to the methodology. While the RW 
always considers 20 days, the EWMA uses weights assigned to the different observations 
over a longer period. This results in a smoothing effect and, in general, slightly lower 
correlations. The range of both correlation results is between 0% and -80%. By looking at the 
correlations around the time of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in Sept. 2008 one can see the 
results are volatile. While in the pre-phase the correlation is around 0%, a jump appears to 
around -80%. This is influenced by the crisis when falling stock valuations led market makers 
to increase spreads based on concerns of being unable to sell shares at a "fair" price. The 
argument of Ernst et al. (2009) is that returns and spreads show perfect correlation during the 
crisis, but this is not born out completely when looking at the results. Even when this would 
be the case, the correlations before and after show that this basic assumption is not correct.    
 
The DCC correlation is much less volatile compared to the EWMA and RW. The reason is 
based on the calculation method. As mentioned previously, the persistence of the covariance 
in the market is measured by  in formula 3.28 and ¦ in 3.29. For the EWMA model a fixed 
smoothing coefficient of  = 0.94 is used. Within the GARCH and GJR model the l and ¦ 
are determined by maximizing the MLE estimator. For the lowest trading volume, ¦ is 
around 0.7 and decreases strongly with increasing trading volume. The l stays more or less 
constant at 0.04 for the three trading volumes. In comparison to that, the EWMA with 0.05 
1 −  shows a close reaction to market shocks. The weight for the long run variance is 
equal to 1 − l − ¦. For the lowest trading volume the weight is 0.26. With increasing trading 
volume this value rises. The impact can be seen in figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 where the DCC 
correlation fluctuates around the result of the CC model.  
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The following figure 3.6 shows the results using the higher volume of 250,000 EUR.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Results of the different correlation models over the total observation period 
In the following chart, the result of the DCC, EWMA and CC correlation model is presented. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is calculated using a 20-day rolling time window named RW. The MLM is calculated by using a trading volume 
of 250,000 EUR..   
 
 
 
 
The results show that the CC results decreased slightly to -37%, demonstrating that 
decreasing stock prices result in smaller increases of liquidity spreads. The same result can be 
seen by looking at the average correlation of the DCC, EWMA and RW model and its 
standard deviation. This is in line with previously mentioned observations that spreads of 
higher traded volumes behave differently. 
 
In figure 3.7 we look at a trading volume of 3 million EUR. The CC model shows a 
correlation of -27% over the total observation period. The trend of a decreasing correlation 
with increasing trading volume is also confirmed here. The highest correlation by comparing 
the trading volume of 25 thousand and 250 thousand EUR results in a decrease of around 
10% during the crisis. 
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Figure 3.7: Results of the different correlation models over the total observation period 
In the following chart the result of the DCC, EWMA and CC correlation model are presented. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is calculated using a 20-day rolling time window named RW. The MLM is calculated using a trading volume of 
3,000,000 EUR.   
 
 
 
 
Within this chapter more sophisticated methods than the EWMA model are used for the first 
time to account for heteroscedasticity. The reason for taking these more advanced models is 
based on the results of the ARCH test (lags 1, 5 and 10) for log and squared log data. For 
example, by using the GARCH model with Gaussian residuals based on the Dax data the 
ARCH test18 was rejected for spreads 91% (returns 90%) and after using the GARCH(1,1) 
model the values change to spreads 24% (returns 20%). This reduction of autocorrelation 
indicates that the models are appropriate for use.  
 
In the following section we analyze advanced volatility models further. To determine the 
quality of the fit, we use mainly the common AIC and BIC criteria19. First we test different 
lags F and  for the 	F,  and 
F,  model. The best overall result is achieved 
when F = 1 and  = 1. Afterwards we test the impact of different AR models on the 
                                                          
18
 The ARCH test of Engle assesses the null hypothesis that a series of residuals r(t) exhibits no conditional 
heteroscedasticity (ARCH effects), against the alternative that an ARCH(L) mode O W = 0 + 1 ∗O − 1W +⋯+  × O − W + `  with at least one non zero  for  = 1… lags. 	Á is that the 
underlying distribution is Chi-square distributed with L degree of freedom. The test can also be performed for 
the squared residuals. The chosen confidence level is 0.05%. 
19
 Akaike information criterion AIC 	= 	 – 2 ∗ MLE	+	2 ∗ CalcParameters and  Bayesian information 
criterion BIC 	= 	 – 2 ∗ MLE	+ 	CalcParameters ∗ 	logNumOfObs are common information criteria to 
determine the quality of models which use the MLE function. 
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relevant results. The simulation results using the 	1,1 model in combination with 
0, 5 and 10 parameters can be found in table 3.4. The results of the ¡ and 
é¡ criteria show that the most negative is achieved by using the 0 process. By using 5 
lags a significant increase of both measures can be achieved. The comparison of the AIC and 
BIC measure by using 5 and 10 lags shows no big increase. By analyzing the different 
	 parameters (which are a result of the MLE fitting process) the outperformance can 
be seen. The 	 term ¦ (which measures the consistency of the conditional volatility in 
the market) is increasing on average and gets closer to the XY@ shock of 94%. Also the 
volatility of the parameter is significantly reduced. In contrast to that is the average 	 
parameter	l decreasing with increases in the number of lags . This results in lower reaction 
on market shocks. By summing both parameter α and β, this value indicates how quickly the 
process is converging to the conditional volatility. On average this value is 0.84 which shows 
that volatility is returning slowly to the long run variance. Another result using higher lags is 
that the conditional mean  of the process (formula 3.11) is increasing significantly. Overall 
it can be said that by using the 5 process more stable results can be achieved which have 
a positive impact on the back-testing results. We also analyzed the relevant results for higher 
and lower traded volumes and these can be found in the appendix table 1.4 for Dax stocks, 
table 1.5 for MDax stocks, table 1.6 for SDax stocks. They are not discussed further because 
the above-mentioned results remain the same. 
 
 
Table 3.4: GARCH fitting results by using log spreads and different lags for the conditional means 
The table shows relevant results of an AR(0), AR(5) and AR(10) GARCH(1,1) model by using log spread changes. To 
determine quality, the Akaike AIC19, Bayesian BIC19 criterion and the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) are used. The 
results are calculated for the Dax, MDax and SDax and by assuming Gaussian distributed residuals. 
 
  
Dax MDax Sdax 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 STD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 
¥ Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 STD 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 
GARCH Mean 0.7220 0.8737 0.8642 0.5149 0.8343 0.8141 0.5847 0.8354 0.8234 STD 0.1591 0.0819 0.0870 0.2359 0.1447 0.1677 0.2382 0.0725 0.1186 
ARCH Mean 0.1180 0.0690 0.0716 0.2194 0.0793 0.0822 0.1786 0.1001 0.0957 STD 0.0404 0.0289 0.0306 0.1252 0.0611 0.0625 0.0522 0.0671 0.0607 
AIC19 Mean -5,596 -5,813 -5,821 -4,800 -5,034 -5,045 -4,222 -4,475 -4,496 
BIC19 Mean -5,576 -5,769 -5,753 -4,781 -4,989 -4,977 -4,202 -4,430 -4,428 
MLE Mean 2,802 2,915 2,925 2,404 2,526 2,537 2,115 2,246 2,262 
Calculated param. 4 9 14 4 9 14 4 9 14 
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The MLE fitting results using the 	1,120 model in combination with return data can 
be found in table 3.5. In contrast to the spreads, the AIC and BIC parameter do not improve 
when considering an autoregressive process. The 	 and 	 terms are as expected 
and show very little standard deviation. This results in stable conditional volatility. At the 
beginning, the conditional volatility of the GARCH model was significantly different to the 
EWMA model. The analysis shows that this is based on very few but extreme peaks within 
the log return data. Therefore we integrate a filter to cap and floor these values at +2.5 ∗
 SROR	Ó`> S and −2.5 ∗  SROR	Ó`> S. This reduces the gap between both 
volatilities and the back-testing performance increases. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Average GARCH fitting results for log returns 
The table shows the MLE fitting results of a AR(0), AR(5) and AR(10) GARCH(1,1) model by using log return changes. 
The results are calculated for Dax, MDax and SDax data by assuming Gaussian distributed residuals. 
 
  
Dax MDax SDax 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 
STD 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
¥ Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
STD 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
GARCH ¦ Mean 0.8836 0.8831 0.8817 0.8584 0.8586 0.8540 0.8389 0.8678 0.8432 
STD 0.0434 0.0457 0.0449 0.0821 0.0847 0.0882 0.1278 0.0561 0.0937 
ARCH l Mean 0.1008 0.1012 0.1024 0.1175 0.1169 0.1212 0.1182 0.1065 0.1197 
STD 0.0323 0.0346 0.0340 0.0472 0.0475 0.0510 0.0555 0.0411 0.0499 
AIC19 Mean -5,019 -5,016 -5,009 -4,590 -4,590 -4,586 -4,654 -4,652 -4,648 
BIC19 Mean -4,999 -4,972 -4,940 -4,571 -4,546 -4,518 -4,634 -4,608 -4,579 
MLE Mean 2,513 2,517 2,519 2,299 2,304 2,307 2,331 2,335 2,338 
Calculated parameter 4 9 14 4 9 14 4 9 14 
 
 
The simulation results (which are discussed above) are based on the assumption of Gaussian 
distributed spreads and returns. By looking at table 3.1 the basic statistics show that spreads 
and returns are far from normal. This indicates that the Cornish Fisher (CF) approximation 
proposed by Ernst et al. (2012) can be used to account for the non-normality. Within this 
paper the normal distribution (confidence level 99%) is used instead of the CF methodology 
for the following reasons. First, it is easier to analyze the impact of the different volatility 
                                                          
20
 The AIC and BIC criterion is used to determine the best number of lags F and  for the GARCH(P,Q) and 
GJR(P,Q) model. There best results are achieved by using F = 1 and  = 1. 
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models21 and secondly, by using the CF parameter the back-testing results show a huge drop. 
This is based on an overestimation of risk. In table 3.6 the average calculated CF parameters 
are listed. Having figure 3.3 in mind for example, it is clear that the CF parameter based on 
the log returns have a much higher impact on the L-VaR than the CF of the spreads. The CF 
values for the log returns are around 3.5 for all indices, which reflect the huge skewness and 
kurtosis of the statistical data analysis in table 3.1. On the other hand, the volatility of the 
models used is already high because of the market turmoil at the end of 2008 (see figure 2.3, 
2.4 and 2.5). By calculating the product of both parameters ( formula 3.18) this resulted 
in an overestimation of risk. In the paper by Ernst et al. (2012) they introduced the CF and 
show the outperformance of this methodology, while in this paper the results indicate an 
underperformance after the market turmoil. This is a well-known problem, as mentioned by 
Alexander (2009). There the author shows that the error term between the CF expansion and 
the Student-T distribution becomes very large for extremely leptokurtic distributions. 
 
 
Table 3.6: Estimated quantiles by using the Cornish Fisher approximation 
The table shows the average Cornish Fisher (CF) approximation for spreads and returns. The CF is calculated by using 
formula 3.3. The results are calculated for Dax, MDax and SDax data.  
 
    Dax     MDax     SDax 
    Vol.* Mean SD Max Min     Vol.* Mean SD Max Min     Vol.* Mean SD Max Min 
Spreads 50 2.69 0.21 3.2 2.28 
 
50 5.01 7.13 29.83 2.28 
 
25 3.77 2.59 13.01 2.31 
 
500 2.62 0.18 3 2.36 
 
100 4.8 6.77 29.28 2.33 
 
75 3.5 1.48 8.62 2.41 
3,000 3.1 0.41 4 2.44 
 
500 4.64 5.5 27.22 2.3 
 
150 3.42 0.76 5.94 2.54 
                                    
Returns 3.66 0.82 6.25 2.57     3.2 0.69 6.69 2.53     3.54 0.95 6.98 2.69 
* Traded volume in 1,000 EUR 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to test different extensions of the basic  −  models proposed 
by Bangia et al. (1999) and Ernst et al. (2012). For that reason, we use advanced conditional 
volatility models like the  − 	 and  − 
 model. The back-testing results of the 
 −  models indicate that, on average, a good performance can be achieved for the Dax 
and MDax while the performance by using the SDax data is still between 60% to 70%. The 
MLE fitting results of the different 	 models are stable and therefore it seems 
                                                          
21
 By combining different methodologies like CF or volatility models it is more difficult to interpret the results. 
Chapter Three: Modeling Correlation in a Liquidity Adjusted VaR 
 
50 
 
appropriate to use them for log return and log spread data. The log spread data show, in 
general, autoregressive behavior. Based on the ¡ and é¡ information criteria, we 
identified that the MLE gives the best results by using a 5 process to adjust the 
conditional mean. Another focus within this paper are the new  −  models which we 
propose. These models account for correlation between log spread and log return data. This is 
new because in the current literature the correlation is assumed to be perfect like mentioned 
by Bangia et al. (1999). Based on our data, we could disprove the assumption and show that 
even during crisis no perfect correlation appears. To demonstrate this we use the Ó-, - 
and the XY@ correlation models and the Pearson correlation coefficient. Overall the back-
testing results indicate that the new  −  models always give a better performance than 
the basic  −  models. The improvement is on average 10%. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Impact of Regulatory Interventions on Stock Liquidity22 
 
4.1 Motivation 
During crisis, investors rebalance their portfolio because they fear losses. The common 
reaction is to reduce the volume invested in equity and to shift this into less volatile assets, 
such as government bonds. This behavior is named “flight to liquidity” (Næs, Skjeltorp, & 
Ødegaard, 2011). Depending on the scale of the crisis, this can lead to a significant imbalance 
between supply (sell) and demand (buy). Between the two parties stands the market maker, 
who takes the interim risk of buying the stock and subsequently selling it to another investor. 
Based on the market’s imbalance, he will then raise or lower the bid-ask spread to be 
compensated for the risk and to manage inventory (Chordia, Roll, & Subrahmanyamb, 2002). 
  
The imbalance between supply and demand for securities is a fundamental self-regulating 
process that determines the "fair price" of a company. During crisis this mechanism fails. 
This can be seen when, for example, investors don’t buy company stocks even when they 
have good and stable results with a low price. This prevents the market reverting to 
equilibrium. At a later stage this will also influence the real economy and, in turn, the wealth 
of the country. To intervene when or before this happens, countries or groups of countries 
(such as the EU) have different methods for restoring stability. One example here is the 
SoFFin23. This organization’s goal is to stabilize the financial sector by providing the market 
with liquidity. 
                                                          
22
 This chapter is based on the working paper (Busch & Lehnert, 2012). 
23
 The SoFFin (Sonderfonds für Finanzmarktstabilisierung) was created in Oct. 2008 to stabilize the financial 
system in Germany. The agency was able to grant guarantees and recapitalization. They were also authorized to 
establish their own resolution agencies under the protection of the federal agency for Financial Market 
Stabilization. 
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The aim of this chapter is to verify the impact of regulatory rescue interventions on financial 
markets at the announcement date. We therefore analyze whether these interventions restore 
stability, or whether they might even have a negative impact. The Xetra Liquidity Measure 
(XLM), provided by Deutsche Börse is used as a common indicator for stability and liquidity 
in the stock market (Stange & Kaserer, 2010). This measure is calculated based on volume-
weighted bid-ask spreads for different traded volumes24. The market reaction is analyzed by 
focusing on return changes.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows. In the next section 4.2, a literature review is performed. 
First we focus on papers discussing the impact of regulatory interventions on financial 
markets. Then we present papers offering different methodologies for performing event 
studies. In section 4.3, we present the event study methodology and in the following section 
4.4, we define scenarios that are subsequently used for the event study. Following this, 
section 4.5 provides a statistical analysis of the underlying spread and return data. In the last 
section 4.6, the results are presented and discussed. Finally, section 4.7 concludes.  
 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
The financial crisis has driven a large number of researchers to publish various papers. One 
research area focuses on the impact of regulatory interventions on financial markets during 
the crisis. The intention is to evaluate whether certain interventions help to restore stability. 
Most of the papers focus on liquidity and returns of stocks as indicators. The first part of the 
following literature review presents the main papers that focus on event studies. The second 
part presents a short introduction of event-study methodologies. 
 
The paper by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) analyzes the market response to regulatory 
interventions on the interbank market between 2007 and 2009. It considers the U.S., the U.K., 
the Euro area, and Japan. The researchers use, e.g., Libor rates (LIBOR), Overnight Index 
Swaps (OIS), and CDS spreads as an indicator for liquidity. They mention that, overall, the 
interbank market reacts positively to recapitalization programs and negatively to the decision 
to bail out individual banks.  
                                                          
24
 A more detailed description can be found in Section 2.5 
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Another paper published by Tong and Wei (2012) focuses on whether unconventional 
interventions unfreeze the credit market. The authors use an international dataset of 192 
interventions from 15 countries between September 2008 and July 2010. The tested events 
focus on deposit insurance, debt guarantee, bank recapitalization, purchase of bank toxic 
assets, and central bank liquidity support. Their results show that interventions targeting the 
whole financial system are more significant than those that focus only on individual financial 
institutions. However, relative to the severity of the financial crisis, the quantitative effect of 
any given intervention is limited. 
 
The paper published by King (2009) focuses on the impact that bank-rescue interventions 
have on the financial markets. The research analyzes 52 banks. As liquidity indicators, King 
uses CDS spreads and stock prices. The results show that, overall, the effect on the share 
price is negative. As one reason for this, he mentions that rescue packages were not designed 
to protect shareholders, whose capital is designed to bear losses. 
 
A paper analyzing the impact of short-selling restrictions on institutional investors was 
published by Bohl et al. (2011). The paper states that, overall, the reaction to short-selling 
restrictions is negative. This result is in line with several other papers, such as Beber and 
Pagano (2013). 
 
A number of other event studies analyzing the post-Lehman crisis from another perspective 
are also worthy of mention. In Neuhierl et al. (2010), the focus is on the impact of press 
releases considering corporate strategy, customers & partners, products & services, 
management changes, and legal issues relating to the stock liquidity and returns. Their results 
state that, in general, return volatility increases as liquidity decreases. They show that the 
crisis did not have an equal impact on all corporates. Another interesting study was carried 
out by Claudio et al. (2010); here, the researchers analyze the abnormality of returns based on 
corporate-responsibility ratings during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. They find that firms 
with more-independent boards and higher institutional ownership experienced worse stock 
returns during the crisis period. 
 
Abnormal performance based on different events is a well-known topic of research. Many 
published papers have analyzed the impact of different events. Of particular note are 
publications by Balaban and Constantinou (2006) and Savickas (2003). These use different 
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methodologies, such as the traditional basic approach described by Brown and Warner 
(1980), the standardized cross-sectional approach introduced by Boehmer et al. (1991), or the 
mean rank approach described by Corrado (1989). In the paper by Savickas (2003), the 
author tests all of the above-mentioned methodologies and concludes that they are not 
sufficient to capture the event-induced volatility for several reasons. Therefore, he proposes a 
GARCH-based approach, which is described and used later in this chapter. The advantage of 
this approach is that the volatility process is modeled directly. 
 
 
4.3 Event Study Methodology 
The test methodology in this paper is introduced by Savickas (2003). He proposes a 	-
based test that accounts for time-varying conditional volatility.    
 
For the test, we use the asymmetric X	 model introduced by Nelson (1991). The 
dynamic conditional behavior of a symmetric normal  − X	F,  process is 
given by the following formula: 
 
 =  + ∑  . +                                                       (4.1) 
 
where the conditional mean for an  is calculated as the O-th order autoregressive 
process: 
 
|¡._ =  + ∑ <Z<_ ._                                            (4.2) 
¢|¡._	~¤0, mW       
 
The X	F,  volatility is calculated using the following formula: 
 
mW = `ab(¥ + n._ + ¦PSm._W 1                                             (4.3) 
Where 
 
n._ = ¯n + 	 |n| − Ö2 ¼⁄                                                   (4.4) 
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is the asymmetric response function. The variable  is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed (iid) and standard normal distributed with the expected value 
X|| = Ö2 ¼⁄ . In contrast to this, n = J6.J6  is the standardized bid-ask spread changes 
or log return. The difference (the part in brackets on the right in formula 4.4) is the deviation 
between the expected and the realized log changes. The long-run variance can be calculated 
as PS(mW1 = ©_.«. For the X	1,1 volatility model, the following constraints must be 
fulfilled: ¥ > 0, l, ¦ ≥ 0, and l + ¦ < 1. The required parameters are calculated using the 
following log-likelihood function: 
 
PS¥, ¯, 	, ¦ = − _W∑ cPSmW + °66
We±_                                            (4.5) 
 
A simple test for abnormal spreads or returns is to focus on the assumption made in formula 
4.2. As the 	´ hypothesis, the residuals of the 	 process are assumed to be ¤0, mW 
distributed. To measure the abnormal return, formula 4.1 must be extended by a dummy 
variable that can measure the deviation relative to the assumption at the event date. The 
formula is: 
 
 =  + ∑ <Z<_ ._ + ¢ + 	<Ó                                                 (4.6) 
 
where the last part consists of the indicator variable Ó; this is 1 when an event happens and 
otherwise equals 0. The parameter 	< contains the absolute excess, which is equal to 	< =
 −  − ∑ <Z<_ ._. This value is then standardized by the calculated conditional mean: 
 
< = 4Î6½                                                                    (4.7) 
 
The test static for abnormality is: 
 
 = ∑ [4

<_ Î _._∑ < − ∑ [4=_ <_                                             (4.8) 
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where the results are t-distributed with N-1 degrees of freedom. Induced abnormal spreads 
and returns are captured with this test cross-sectional event.  
 
To test the robustness of the conditional volatility model we also calculate results using 
constant volatility and equal volatility. 
 
 
4.4 Regulatory Events  
In this chapter we analyze the impact of different events on abnormal bid-ask spreads and 
return changes. The selected events focus mainly on European countries after the Lehman 
default in 2008. The Federal Reserve Bank (FED) of New York published a timeline showing 
the main interventions in chronological order25. The FED subdivides these events into the 
following categories: 
• Bank liability guarantees 
• Liquidity and rescue interventions 
• Unconventional monetary policy 
• Other market interventions 
 
Based on single category events, listed by the FED (Appendix: Table 2.1), we create 10 
scenarios; these can be found in table 4.1. The timeline of the FED shows that events from 
different categories can happen at the same time. It is then impossible to allocate 
responsibility for the abnormality to one event, and we therefore exclude all events on this 
day. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
25
 http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/policyresponses.html 
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Table 4.1: Defined event scenarios  
This table shows the defined scenarios based on the individual events presented in table 2.1 in the appendix. 
 
  Event No.  No. of events Event category 
All events from the FED 
timeline   
(double events are excluded) 
1 12 Bank Liability Guarantees 
2 21 Liquidity and Rescue Interventions 
3 6 Other Market Interventions 
4 7 Unconventional Monetary Policy 
Only German events from the 
FED timeline  
 (double events are excluded) 
5 6 Bank Liability Guarantees 
6 4 Bank Liability Guarantees (only SoFFin) 
7 7 Liquidity and Rescue Interventions 
8 5 Liquidity and Rescue Interventions (only SoFFin) 
Short sell restrictions / ban 9 18 All short sell restrictions / ban  10 1 German short sell restriction  
 
 
The first four scenarios correspond to the four categories proposed by the FED in table 2.1 of 
the appendix. To create scenarios 5 and 7, we extract from scenario 1 and 2 only the events 
that occur in Germany. Scenarios 6 and 8 are created by considering only the SoFFin events 
from scenarios 5 and 7. In scenario 9 we select international short-selling restrictions, and in 
scenario 10 we select only German short-selling restrictions. The last two scenarios are not 
created based on the FED timeline but by using the events mentioned in the paper by Beber 
and Pagano (2013). 
 
Scenario 1 consists of 12 events where bank liability guarantees were announced (Appendix: 
Table 2.1). One example could be seen when Hypo Real Estate received EUR 25 billion from 
Germany on Sep. 29, 2008. In scenario 2, 21 events are selected to allow consideration of 
liquidity and rescue interventions. One example here is the EUR 8.2 billion loan for 
Commerzbank AG provided by the SoFFin. The third scenario contains six events and deals 
with other market interventions, such as interbank liquidity supply. This includes, for 
example, unlimited swap lines provided by the FED to various other central banks. Short-
selling restrictions, which are also listed in the FED timeline in this category, are extracted 
and will be tested in the separate scenarios 9 and 10. Finally, scenario 4 captures 
unconventional monetary-policy interventions. These are events where sovereigns 
(regulators) change their normal policy based on the crisis. This can be, for example, when 
the national bank buys non-eligible assets (toxic papers) and therefore absorbs the risk and 
provides liquidity. 
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In scenarios 5 and 7, the intention is to focus on scenarios 1 and 2, as defined above, but only 
selecting events that occurred in Germany. 
 
Scenarios 6 and 8 are subsamples of scenarios 5 and 7 and focus exclusively on SoFFin 
(Sonderfonds für Finanzmarktstabilisierung) interventions. The SoFFin was created in 
Oct. 2008 with the function of restoring stability to the financial markets. It is able therefore 
to provide various banks, such as Hypo Real Estate, with liquidity in the form of guarantees. 
 
In scenarios 9 and 10, the intention is to analyze the impact of short-selling restrictions. The 
first scenario therefore only analyzes the impact of international short-selling restrictions. In 
contrast to this, the second scenario only contains the short-selling restriction imposed by 
Germany. Because of an inconsistency within the FED timeline, we decided to use the event 
dates stated in Beber and Pagano (2013). 
 
 
4.5 Empirical Data Analysis 
The empirical data focuses on stocks listed in the Dax for a five-year period (Jul. 1, 2005 – 
Sep. 30, 2010). Once new listings, de-listings, and data-quality problems were accounted for, 
we selected 23 remaining stocks that fulfilled the requirements. 
 
The returns are calculated based on daily mid-price b: 
 
O = ln	 Í6Í6d&                                                                    (4.9) 
 
The weighted bid-ask spreads for different traded volumes are provided by Deutsche Börse. 
These values are calculated and offered on a daily basis under the name Xetra Liquidity 
Measure (XLM). The XLM is denoted in bps and is a measure for the costs arising through 
buying and directly selling a stock (round trip). An advantage of the XLM is that the costs of 
a round trip are calculated based on different quantities,	. In general it can be said that with 
increasing traded volumes, more missing XLM data appear because not many or no trades 
have taken place with this order size. This paper considers the following trading volumes for 
the Dax stocks: 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 thousand and 1, 2 and 3 million.    
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The XLM is calculated using the following formula, as stated by Kaserer and Stange (2008). 
The value at time   is: 
 
XLMq, t = %&'(∑ *+,,-+,,+ .∑ /0,,-0,,0 12345,6 	7 ∗ 10,000                                     (4.10) 
 
where ;< and < are different bid and ask prices for limit order volumes >< and >= . 
 
A statistical analysis of the underlying mean corrected return and spread data is presented in 
table 4.2. On average, the return results for the Dax show a mean of zero, which indicates a 
stationary process. This is a prerequisite for subsequent use of the X	 model. The data 
shows a high excess kurtosis. Compared to the excess kurtosis, the skewness shows behavior 
that is not far from normal. The Jarque-Berra (JB)26 test (95% confidence level) is rejected 
for all Dax stocks, which proves that the data are not normally distributed. 
 
 
Table 4.2: Summary statistics 
The table shows a statistical analysis of the mean adjusted log spread and log return data. For all stocks, the mean, standard 
deviation, skewness and excess kurtosis are calculated. In addition, the percentage value is listed when the Jarque-Bera26 is 
rejected.  
 
  
Dax Spread (23 stocks) 
Mean Median SD Max Min 
Return statistics   
  
Mean* -0.062 -0.026 0.404 0.587 -1.403 
SD 0.025 0.023 0.005 0.037 0.016 
Skewness -0.027 0.129 0.456 0.613 -0.902 
Kurtosis 11.920 10.829 5.085 26.137 6.400 
JB-test (95%) 100%         
    
Spread statistics   
  
Mean* 0.206 0.189 0.329 1.192 -0.504 
SD 0.187 0.183 0.037 0.285 0.086 
Skewness -0.047 -0.062 0.131 0.306 -0.446 
Kurtosis 4.504 4.097 1.377 10.590 3.152 
JB-test (95%) 94%         
* values in 1,000             
 
 
                                                          
26
 The null hypothesis of the Jarque-Bera test assumes that the sample comes from a normal distribution with 
unknown mean and variance, against the alternative that it does not come from a normal distribution. 
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By looking at the statistical results of the spread data, one can see that, on average, the log 
spreads also have a mean that is close to zero. This fulfills the prerequisite of the X	 
model that the data must be stationary. Compared to the log returns, the log spreads show a 
much larger standard deviation. Another indicator for the abnormality is the excess kurtosis, 
which is around 9 on average. This shows that the spread data contains extreme values, which 
might present difficulties for the model used later. The JB test is rejected in nearly all cases, 
which indicates that the spread data does not exhibit a normal distribution. The spread data 
show a significant autoregression, also described by Chen and Poon (2008). The results of 
our analysis can be found in table 4.3. We use the common measures MLE, AIC, and BIC to 
identify the number of lags. The results show that no significant autocorrelation is observed 
for returns, whereas for spreads the effect is dominant until lag 5. For the spread volatility, 
we therefore use an 5	X		1,1 model, as used by Busch and Lehnert (2011). 
 
 
Table 4.3: Calculation results of different 	,  models  
This table shows the results of different a		1,1 models by using log spread and log return data over the total 
observation period. In the first part, the GARCH parameters are calculated as stated in formula 4.1. For spreads, the numbers 
represent the average over the traded volumes 1-8. The second part lists the corresponding results of the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC)27, Bayesian information criterion (BIC)28, and Maximum Likelihood function. 
  
  
Dax Spread Dax Return 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004 STD 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 
¥ Mean -1.0390 -0.3072 -0.3618 -0.1691 -0.1716 -0.1728 STD 1.4045 0.5006 0.5770 0.1117 0.1120 0.1130 
GARCH Mean 0.8719 0.9631 0.9568 0.9782 0.9779 0.9778 STD 0.1717 0.0605 0.0693 0.0136 0.0137 0.0137 
ARCH Mean 0.2254 0.1118 0.1195 0.1574 0.1594 0.1608 STD 0.1673 0.0995 0.1030 0.0496 0.0526 0.0546 
AIC Mean -6,912 -7,198 -7,210 -6,709 -6,705 -6,699 
BIC Mean -6,886 -7,146 -7,133 -6,683 -6,653 -6,621 
MLE Mean 3,461 3,609 3,620 3,359 3,362 3,364 
Calculated param. 4 9 14 4 9 14 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 ¡ = 2 − 2PS. Here,  is the number of parameters in the statistical model, and  is the result of the 
maximum likelihood function. 
28
 BIC = −2 ∗ lnL + k ∗ lnn, where L is the result of the maximum likelihood function, k is the number of 
parameters that have to be estimated, and n is the number of observations. 
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4.6 Empirical Performance and Discussion 
 
This section discusses the test results, focusing on abnormal changes in bid-ask spreads and 
returns based on the scenarios defined in Section 4.4. The intention is to analyze whether 
certain market interventions are reflected in the market at the announcement date. In 
comparison to many other event studies, we also use volume-weighted bid-ask spreads in 
addition to returns to capture the impact of events on liquidity. According to our research, 
this is the first time this has been done. 
 
The discussion is structured as follows. Firstly, we give an introduction to how spreads and 
returns behave during normal and crisis periods. Here, the focus is especially on how they 
influence one another. The information we gathered in the first part is then used to analyze 
the test results according to abnormal spread and return changes. 
 
In general, a negative return is the result of a decreasing share price. This equates to a loss for 
the shareholder. The implication of a negative bid-ask spread change stands contrary to this. 
This is because bid-ask spreads are costs (approx. half of the spread) that the investor has to 
pay when the stock is sold. It is interesting to see not only the way that spreads and returns 
react individually to interventions, but also what interaction can be observed between the 
two. 
  
In the paper published by Amihud and Mendelson (1980), they mention that spreads and 
returns exhibit a positive correlation. Increasing stock returns result in increasing illiquidity. 
Busch and Lehnert (2011) demonstrated that this is not the case even during the financial 
crisis that began in 2008. In the paper by Hameed et al. (2010), they show further that 
negative returns reduce liquidity more than positive returns raise liquidity. 
  
Another paper written by Chordia et al. (2002) analyzes the relationship between spreads and 
returns, with a focus on order imbalances. The paper mentions that, especially during crisis, 
spreads and returns are strongly affected by extreme order imbalances, which influence the 
inventory of the market maker. The reaction of the market maker to such imbalances is to 
change spreads and revise quotations. Based on this research, one can argue that abnormal 
spreads and returns can be negatively correlated based on extreme order imbalances during 
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the crisis starting in 2008. At that time, many investors wanted to or were forced to sell their 
stocks and therefore to create a demand for liquidity (liquidity effect). 
  
On the other hand, the market maker faces constraints that prevent him from providing 
unlimited liquidity to the market. This includes, for example, the size of the stock position in 
his inventory. When one or more of these constraints are met, he may stop buying shares 
(Deutsche Börse AG, 2012). To reduce the market risk in his inventory he will also try to 
reduce the stock position; this creates even more demand for liquidity. This spiral effect 
results in the financial market increasingly drying up, as described by Hameed et al. (2010). 
But, of course, the market maker will not wait until his constraints are hit or the market dries 
up. 
  
This brings us to the research papers written by Yakov (2002) and Bookstaber (1999), which 
show that spreads and returns can exhibit acyclic behavior. The first paper states that the 
market maker uses spreads and returns to influence and manage supply/demand and that 
therefore these also include the expectations of the future development of the market. This 
can also be seen in our results: for some events, for example, abnormal negative returns can 
appear with abnormal negative spread changes. This would indicate that the market is 
decreasing but that expectations are positive. 
 
The simulation results of the event study can be found in table 4.4. These results are 
calculated using formula 4.8 and consider different volume-weighted bid-ask spread and 
return data. The results follow a Student-T distribution with S − 1 degrees of freedom. 
Positive and negative significant values are highlighted by using a 95% confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: Impact of Regulatory Interventions on Stock Liquidity 
63 
 
Table 4.4: Test results of abnormal spread and return data 
The table contains the t-test results for abnormal spread and return changes at the announcement date calculated by using 
formula 4.8. The colors indicate significant positive or negative change based on a 95% confidence level. 
 
Dax Volume Return 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
 
Event 
 
 
 
 
 
1 8.1 8.62 8.8 7.43 5.77 3.84 3.77 3.13 -4.15 
2 -8.47 -8.43 -6.73 -4.69 -3.08 -2.92 -4.42 -3.69 3.03 
3 3.21 3.53 3.67 2.84 1.34 -0.88 -1.18 -1.21 -3.25 
4 1.41 1.34 1.08 1.29 2.16 2.76 1.26 0.61 -1.63 
5 5.5 6.62 6.94 5.55 4 2.88 2.12 1.43 -1.44 
6 5.93 7.13 6.64 3.1 1.42 0.39 0.23 -0.09 0.23 
7 1.27 1.74 1.55 1.07 0.7 0.21 -0.61 -0.56 -0.93 
8 2 2.89 3.32 2.95 2.16 1.33 0.61 1.04 -2.67 
9 -7.69 -17.13 -17.34 -16.25 -10.36 -5.9 -4 -3.91 7.21 
10 -0.88 -1.31 -1.76 -1.79 -0.6 0.33 1.32 1.12 -3.59 
 
 
As defined in Section 4.4, the first four scenarios consider all events from the four categories. 
The result of the first scenario indicates that market reaction is negative when bank liability 
guarantees are given. This is based on a significant increase in abnormal spreads and 
significant decrease in abnormal returns. The imbalance of the order book, where the demand 
of liquidity is dominant, leads to a drying-up of the financial market. This reaction to the 
intervention is in line with the observations made by King (2009). He further mentions that, 
in general, banks that are involved in rescue intervention suffered more than those that are 
not. In contrast to his analysis, which focused on banking stocks, our results show that the 
negative reactions to the intervention is not limited to financial companies. This spillover 
effect between different industries shows that investors anticipate negative cross-effects. 
Based on uncertainty in the market, they change their portfolio composition and step out of 
the stock markets, shifting into safer investments (they “fly to quality”) (Næs, Skjeltorp, & 
Ødegaard, 2011). By looking at the average abnormal spreads of the different traded volumes 
it can be seen that higher volumes react more weakly than smaller volumes at the event date. 
This observation is contrary to the information given in Figure 4.1. Here it can be seen that, 
on average, the spreads increase almost exponentially with the traded volume. Our conclusion 
is that, with increasing trading volume, the spreads become so high already that no large 
adjustments are necessary. This means that the market maker is already risk-averse for higher 
traded volumes before the event occurs. Table 4.5 presents the results of a t-test, comparing 
high (Volumes 6 and 8) versus low (Volume 1) traded volumes. The numbers show that there 
is an asymmetric increase in the spreads at the event date.    
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Figure 4.1: Mean spreads of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
The following chart is created based on Figure 2.1 and shows the different reactions of average spreads (in bps) considering 
different trading volumes in pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. The volumes Vol. 1 to Vol. 8 are equal to the trading 
volumes 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 thousand and 1, 2, and 3 million. 
 
 
 
 
The results of scenario 2 provide a good example of the ability of market intervention to 
restore stability. Here different liquidity and rescue interventions are announced. The 
results show, on average, a significant increase in returns and a decrease in spreads. This 
implies that the financial market is more stable. The same result is described by Bohl et al. 
(2011), although that study focuses on liquidity in the banking sector. As a liquidity measure, 
the authors use Libor-OIS rates that indicate the future expected liquidity supply in the 
interbank market. A low Libor-OIS reduces funding pressure and counterparty risk (Aït-
Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak, & Tamirisa, 2012). It is interesting to see that, for this 
scenario too, the whole Dax market is significantly affected even though most of the events 
focus only on the financial sector (e.g., SoFFin gives EUR 8 billion loan to Commerzbank or 
the government of Switzerland injects CHF 6 billion into UBS). This kind of overall co-
movement typically appears during crisis and reduces the efficiency of the diversification 
effect within portfolios (also according to liquidity), as stated by Markowitz et al. (2009) and 
Bissantz et al. (2010). By considering the higher traded volumes, one can see a significantly 
positive reaction to liquidity. The comparison shows that the effect decreases with increasing 
traded volume. This is the same behavior as we detected in the first scenario, albeit simply in 
reverse. The spreads of the higher traded volumes will still remain at a high level. 
Vol. 1 Vol. 2 Vol. 3 Vol. 4 Vol. 5 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 Vol. 8
Pre-crisis 7.63 8.58 10.55 16.77 26.85 44.30 72.98 100.29
Crisis 12.22 15.19 20.96 37.16 63.47 115.63 226.69 349.25
Post-crisis 6.84 7.88 9.79 14.66 22.00 37.77 74.11 111.02
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Furthermore, based on the results in table 4.4, an asymmetric increase of spreads can be 
found in this scenario. 
 
The third scenario shows significant negative returns by focusing on other market 
interventions29. By looking at the spreads, we observe a different response. For small traded 
volumes, significant positive abnormal spreads appear; these result in an increase in market 
illiquidity. In contrast, higher traded volumes show a slightly negative abnormality. The 
results indicate that FED and other central bank interventions helped to bring back stability. 
Most of these interventions focused on liquidity support from the FED to the ECB, SNB, and 
BoE by, e.g., providing unlimited U.S. dollar swap lines. The reason for this intervention is 
that, after the Lehman collapse, international financial institutions in particular were hit by 
the phenomenon of dollar shortage. In the papers by Beba and Packer (2009) and 
McAndrews (2009), they mention the positive feedback to the Libor and federal fund rates. 
This is also recognized by the financial market, which shows a positive reaction to the 
intervention. 
 
In scenario 4, the Dax data did not exhibit significant behavior overall. While, on average, the 
returns decreased, the spreads showed a positive response (two of eight are significant) to 
unconventional interventions. Most of the events focus on buying governmental bills or 
bonds from commercial banks and therefore providing liquidity. The research published by 
Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) shows, by focusing on the financial sector, that no significant results 
are detected either. It states that there are only small improvements in liquidity. Another 
paper focusing on the impact on stock prices was published by Tong and Wei (2012). Here, 
the researchers state a slightly positive impact on liquidity. Furthermore, they find that 
companies that had high liquidity needs before the announcement benefited especially from 
the interventions. Given all Dax data, our results again show, on average, equal behavior 
across all stocks and industries. Compared to the aforementioned scenarios, there is, on 
average, no significance between bid-ask spreads of the different traded volumes. This is also 
confirmed by the t-test results in the following table 4.5. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 We exclude short selling restrictions. They are dealt with separately in scenarios 9 and 10.  
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Table 4.5: T-stats of abnormal returns by comparing different trading volumes 
This table shows t-test results obtained by comparing mean bid-ask spreads of the traded Volumes 1 & 6 and 1 & 8. The 
grey color indicates a significant deviation based on a 95% confidence level. 
 
  Vol. 1 vs. Vol. 6 Vol. 1 vs. Vol. 8 
Event 1 0.893 2.162 
Event 2 2.74 2.539 
Event 3 3.116 3.274 
Event 4 0.583 0.519 
Event 5 0.811 2.026 
Event 6 2.798 3.419 
Event 7 0.567 1.245 
Event 8 0.145 0.402 
Event 9 3.858 4.767 
Event 10 0.827 1.417 
 
 
Up till now, we have discussed the results of the four scenarios, considering all events within 
the FED timeline. In the next part, we will analyze the impact of domestic events on the local 
stock market. This can be achieved by comparing scenario 1 versus scenario 5 and scenario 2 
versus scenario 7, focusing on bank liability guarantees and liquidity and rescue interventions 
(Scenarios 6 and 7 are a subsample of scenarios 1 and 2 that only considers SoFFin events). 
The comparison of scenarios 1 and 5 shows that there are differences between the average 
spread and return values. In scenario 1, the spreads are higher and the returns are lower 
compared to scenario 5, indicating that the German financial market experiences a greater 
effect based on international bank-liability interventions. This is called the spillover effect, 
which is also described by Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012). In their paper, the researchers analyze the 
impact of this effect on market interventions before and after the crisis. They find that the 
spillover effect is significantly higher during crisis. Similar results are described by the 
International Monetary Fund (2009), which analyzes the impact of U.S. crisis interventions 
on the European market. Comparing, in particular, the change in abnormal spreads between 
low and high volume allows an asymmetric behavior to be observed. Starting from 
scenario 5, where only German events are considered, the abnormal spread of the lowest 
trading volume increased by 147%, while for the highest trading volume the abnormal spread 
increased by 219% on average. Contrary to this, the abnormal returns decreased by 287%. In 
scenario 6, only the SoFFin events are considered. As already mentioned in section 4.3, the 
task of the SoFFin is to restore stability to the financial system by, e.g., providing liquidity to 
different banks in the form of guarantees. The results show that the abnormal spreads for the 
lower traded volumes are small, while for higher traded volumes these events show no 
significant abnormality. The abnormal returns slightly increased based on these events. Based 
Chapter Four: Impact of Regulatory Interventions on Stock Liquidity 
67 
 
on the results it can be said that the Dax did not react positively to the intervention. At the 
announcement date the spreads showed an asymmetric increase of abnormality, which can be 
seen in table 4.5. 
 
An even more significant difference can be seen by comparing scenarios 2 and 7, which both 
focus on liquidity and rescue interventions. The results indicate that international 
interventions significantly decreased the abnormal spreads and restored liquidity to the 
market. Whereas when focusing only on German events one can even observe a slight (not 
significant) increase of abnormal spreads. The abnormal returns also show the same behavior. 
Comparing the traded volumes, the lowest decreased by 667% while the highest decreased by 
659%, based on scenario 7. By analyzing just the SoFFin events within scenario 7, the results 
are visible in scenario 8. It can be seen that the abnormal spreads increase significantly in 4 
out of 8 traded volumes and that the returns decrease significantly. This is a clear sign that the 
market reacts negatively to SoFFin interventions and that liquidity dries up. 
 
The above results show a huge spillover effect that appeared during the crisis. Based on the 
results, it is important that market interventions should not be managed by each sovereign 
individually, but rather on a more global level. This is also stated by various other papers, 
such as Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012). In addition, we could see in nearly all cases that the log 
changes of different traded volumes react asymmetrically to the same events. This should be 
considered in future risk methodologies. 
 
The last scenarios, scenarios 9 and 10, are used to analyze the impact of short-selling 
restrictions based on international interventions and then, separately, on German intervention. 
The results show that there are significant abnormal positive changes in returns and mainly 
significant negative changes in the abnormal spreads (all eight volumes are significant). This 
indicates that the financial market reacts positively and, consequently, increases liquidity. 
The interpretation of the results is still difficult because they differ from those of other papers 
published by, e.g., Beber and Pagano (2013) or Battalio and Schultz (2011). The paper by 
Battalio and Schultz (2011) finds that, at the announcement date, the market reacts negatively 
because short selling is only part of the overall trading activity. For them, trading is equal to 
liquidity. After the interventions, the number of market participants and trades decreases. 
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Our interpretation is based on order imbalances described by Chordia et al. (2002). The 
situation before the announcement is that liquidity supply (investors want to sell stocks) is not 
a problem but the liquidity demand (investors want to buy stocks) is. Based on the 
announcement, investors are now buying stocks to close their positions, which increase 
liquidity in the market. In the last scenario (scenario 10) only the impact of the German short-
selling restriction on the Dax is analyzed. The results for abnormal spreads are negative 
overall while the abnormal returns are slightly positive. It is interesting to see that the 
domestic financial market reacts much more weakly to local interventions than to 
international action. This again shows the spillover effect. We believe that the German 
market already expected this to happen as a result of the announcements by, e.g., the U.S., 
Canada, the U.K., Switzerland, Luxembourg and Ireland a day beforehand. This would 
explain why reaction to local intervention shows such a different result. 
 
Until now we only focused on the advance-event study methodology which models the 
volatility process by using a X − 	 model. To test the robustness of the results, we 
repeated the calculations with different volatility assumptions. In the results presented in 
appendix table 2.2 a constant volatility and in appendix table 2.3 an equal volatility is 
assumed. The comparison shows that for the returns the number of significant results stays 
the same. For spreads they are slightly different. This can be seen in scenario 7 which focuses 
on liquidity and rescue interventions only in Germany. Here the event methodology shows 
with constant volatility two positive significant results and with equal volatility three positive 
significant results for lower traded volumes. This indicates that the market has a significantly 
negative reaction after these interventions. Overall it can be said that the test results are 
(including for spreads) pretty much the same. When there are changes in significance they are 
mainly based on small changes of the test results. Therefore our general findings remain and 
seem to be robust. Based on the underlying data it is more accurate to use the advanced event 
study methodology. 
 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we use volume-weighted bid-ask spread and return data to test the abnormality 
of stocks within the Dax, based on interventions starting in 2008 during the financial crisis. 
To this end, we define different scenarios focusing on the following categories: bank 
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liabilities guarantees, liquidity and rescue interventions, unconventional monetary policy and 
other market interventions. These interventions were aimed at restoring stability to the 
financial market. Based on the test results, different conclusions can be made. Overall, it can 
be said that the market reacts differently to these events with the same purpose: e.g., the 
market reacts positively to liquidity and rescue interventions and negatively to bank liabilities 
guarantees. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of international interventions on the 
domestic financial market. In this respect, we find that market interventions, which are 
triggered from abroad, have a significant spillover effect on the local financial market. This 
result shows that market interventions should be managed on a global level. Another 
interesting effect is that all stocks within the Dax are closely linked to the reaction of 
financial institutions within the index. Therefore even diversified portfolios suffered during 
the crisis. We also examine closely the impact of regulatory interventions on different traded 
volumes. Here the results show that in most cases a significant asymmetry appears. Overall, 
the spreads for lower traded volumes react more strongly than those for higher volumes at the 
announcement date. We also performed a robustness check of the conditional volatility model 
by performing the same calculations with constant and equal volatility approaches. The 
results remained the same overall. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Liquidity Commonality and Option Prices30 
 
5.1 Motivation 
 
Equity markets and option markets are directly linked to each other. While in the last two 
chapters (3 and 4) the focus is mainly on stock market liquidity, in this chapter we want to 
concentrate more on option market liquidity. Therefore we analyze the relationship between 
stock liquidity and option implied volatility. The following questions are focused on: 
 
1) What impact does stock market liquidity have on option implied volatility? 
2) What is the impact of market (systematic) liquidity versus single stock (idiosyncratic) 
liquidity? 
3) How does the relationship change during the Lehman crisis in 2008? 
 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. First, we take a closer look at the data used, 
including a detailed description of the advanced liquidity measure XLM. Afterwards we test 
different hypothesis on a daily and monthly basis to analyze what impact stock liquidity and 
market liquidity have on implied volatility. In this context, we also focus on the time-varying 
liquidity commonality. In the last section the findings are summarized. 
 
 
5.2 Literature Review 
 
In various papers different liquidity measures are proposed. They can be separated roughly 
into one-dimensional and multi-dimensional measures (von Wyss, 2004). While the first 
                                                          
30
 This chapter is based on the working paper (Busch & Lehnert, 2013). 
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group focuses only on single attributes (e.g. daily traded volume or market capitalization 
(Sarr & Lybek, 2002)) the second group combines single measures from the first group. One 
frequently-used one-dimensional measure is the bid-ask spread (Amihud & Mendelson, 
1986). The weakness of this is that with increasing trading volume the spread increases 
exponentially, as mentioned by Kaserer and Stange (2008). Therefore the liquidity risk of 
higher traded volumes is neglected. One measure which also considers this is provided by the 
Deutsche Börse and is called the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM). This multi-dimensional 
measure is based on volume-weighted bid-ask spreads31. In the paper by Kaserer and Stange 
(2010) they demonstrate the outperformance of this measure compared to others. Based on 
the above mentioned advantages, we use the XLM to capture liquidity in this chapter. 
 
Beside liquidity in stock markets, it also plays an important role in option markets. Here we 
can mention Vijh (1990) who analyzes the liquidity of CBOE stock options compared with 
NYSE stocks. Based on the observation that large trading volumes can be absorbed without 
big changes in price, he assumes this market to be liquid. In the same direction there are the 
results by Kalondera and Schlag (2004). They find a positive relationship between stock 
market activity (measured by the transaction volume) and option market liquidity. This is in 
line with the results by George and Francis (1993) which show that trading activity and the 
bid-ask spreads have a negative correlation. 
 
Another indicator for option liquidity or the option price is to focus on implied volatility. The 
link between liquidity and the "implied volatility smile" has been described by Rubinstein 
(1985). In the papers by Chou et al. (2011) and Christoffersen et al. (2012) they mention that 
a reduction in spot liquidity results in an increase in the implied volatility curve. This is in 
line with the argumentation of Cetin et al. (2006). They show that increasing illiquidity in the 
underlying stock results in higher hedging costs in the option market. By analyzing only data 
within the option market Chou et al. (2011) can find a positive link between implied volatility 
and option illiquidity. These findings are supported by the suggestion of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) and Christoffersen et al. (2012) that there is an illiquidity premium in the 
option market. In the paper by Bollen and Wahley (2004) they analyze the relationship 
between net buying pressure and implied volatility. They find that changes in the implied 
volatility for index options are affected by net buying pressure for index puts while stock 
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 A detailed description of this measure can be found in the following section 2.5  
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options are affected by the demand of call options. Also we can mention here the publication 
by Ammann et al. (2010). They discover a relationship between stock returns and lagged 
implied volatilities for the US equity option market. The results of the above mentioned 
papers show that implied volatility is a good indicator for option prices and liquidity. 
Therefore we focus on implied volatility as a measure for option market liquidity in the 
chapter. 
 
Beside research papers which describe the impact of liquidity on option prices, other papers 
extend the classical arbitrage pricing theory to incorporate liquidity (Jarrow & Protter, 2007). 
One possibility is to model a stochastic supply curve for security prices depending on the 
trade size. In the paper by Certin et al. (2006) this model is used to incorporate illiquidity into 
an extended Black Scholes model. The results show that liquidity costs are a significant 
component in option prices especially with increased trading volume of the underlying 
security.  
 
One often-neglected topic is the analysis of liquidity commonalities in stocks. As described 
by Chordia et al. (2000) liquidity risk is not only limited to the single stock level. In their 
paper they detect co-movements in stock liquidity which indicates market liquidity. They 
raise further research questions regarding external shocks such as political events, 
macroeconomic conditions or even hysteria. Their methodology is used by Rösch and 
Kaserer (2012) in combination with the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM). They support the 
existence of liquidity commonality between the market liquidity and stock returns. This 
commonality varies over time and shows a strong relationship with negative return changes. 
The impact of liquidity commonality within the equity option market has been studied by 
Duan and Wei (2009). By using S&P 100 data they demonstrate that systematic risk leads to 
higher implied volatility and a steeper slope in the implied volatility curve. In the publication 
by Datar et al. (1998) they focus on the equity market and demonstrate that liquidity plays an 
important role in cross-sectional returns. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: Liquidity Commonality and Option Prices 
73 
 
5.3 Empirical Data Analysis 
 
The empirical data used in this chapter are stocks and options listed in the Dax index. Based 
on data quality problems, new listings or de-listings, 23 stocks are selected for our research. 
The observation period is between 11.17.2005 – 09.30.2010 (1,216 observations). 
 
We want to have a specific focus on different market situations in terms of pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis periods. Therefore the summery statistic shows a detailed analysis for each 
period:  
• Pre-crisis 11.17.2005 – 08.29.2008 
• Crisis  09.01.2008 – 12.30.2009 
• Post-crisis  01.04.2010 – 09.30.2010 
These crisis time periods are used in Rösch and Kaserer (2012). 
 
To measure liquidity we use volume-weighted bid-ask spreads. This measure is provided by 
the Deutsche Börse under the name "Xetra Liquidity Measure" (XLM). The XLM is denoted 
in bps and is a measure of the costs arising through buying and subsequently selling the stock 
(round trip). An advantage of the XLM is that the costs of a round trip are calculated using 
different quantities	 (Gomber & Schweikert, 2002). In general it can be said that with 
increasing trading volume, more missing XLM data appear because few or no trades have 
taken place with this order size at that day. Because of this we consider 8 out of 10 volumes 
which are: 25 (Vol. 1), 50 (Vol. 2), 100 (Vol. 3), 250 (Vol. 4), 500 thousand (Vol. 5) and 1 
(Vol. 6), 2 (Vol. 7), 3 million (Vol. 8). The XLM is calculated using the following formula 
(Gomber & Schweikert, 2002). The value at time   is: 
 
XLMq, t = %&'(∑ *+,,-+,,+ .∑ /0,,-0,,0 12345,6 	7 ∗ 10,000                                     (5.1) 
 
where b and a are different bid and ask prices for limit order volumes v and v. 
 
In figure 5.1 we can see that the bid-ask spreads increase with trading volume. Additionally 
there is a difference between pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis times. During the crisis the 
spreads are higher overall. Between the crisis and no crisis periods the spreads increase 
exponentially with traded volume.  
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Figure 5.1: Average spread changes of 23 selected Dax stocks by considering different traded 
volumes 
The following table shows the average volume-weighted bid-ask spread changes for different traded volumes32 over the total 
observation period of 5 years. In addition, the time period is subdivided into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. 
 
 
 
 
A summary statistic for the attributes can be found in table 5.1. By looking at the periodic 
changes in table 5.1 we can see that with higher trading volumes the average change and the 
corresponding standard deviation increase. The comparison between the different crisis 
periods shows that pre-crisis the average changes are nearly equal to those during the crisis. 
In the post-crisis period there is a drop in these values. 
                                                          
32
 The different volumes, Vol. 1 – Vol. 8, correspond to 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 thousand and 1, 2, and 3 million 
traded volume. 
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics  
The following table gives an overview of the attributes which we use in this paper. The values are average periodic changes. A special focus is on different market situations like 
pre-crisis (11.17.2005 – 08.29.2008), crisis (09.01.2008 – 12.30.2009) and post-crisis (01.04.2010 – 09.30.2010) times. Overall 1216 observations are considered over a period of 
around 5 years.  
 
  
Liquidity Spreads  
Prices 
 Impl. Volatility  
DTV 
 
P/C ratio** 
Vol. 1 Vol. 2 Vol. 3 Vol. 4 Vol. 5 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 Vol. 8   110% 100% 90%   
Pre-crisis 
Mean 0.013 0.013 0.015 0.018 0.021 0.024 0.023 0.024  0.039*  0.008 0.005 0.010  0.129  2.001 
SD 0.084 0.086 0.088 0.095 0.099 0.101 0.097 0.094  0.011  0.040 0.038 0.043  0.379  2.694 
Skew 0.537 0.528 0.508 0.454 0.393 0.324 0.345 0.477  -0.358  1.023 1.397 1.293  2.356  3.116 
Kurt 1.788 1.886 1.960 1.716 1.128 0.615 0.463 0.910  2.856  4.015 6.758 5.035  11.134  11.947 
Crisis 
Mean 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.020 0.026 0.030  0.025*  0.011 0.004 0.009  0.089  1.784 
SD 0.093 0.097 0.099 0.098 0.095 0.102 0.117 0.125  0.026  0.057 0.053 0.054  0.281  2.428 
Skew 0.896 1.047 1.222 1.115 0.591 0.499 0.775 0.900  0.518  0.949 0.548 0.442  1.085  3.819 
Kurt 7.027 8.572 10.313 8.829 3.230 1.102 1.536 1.875  4.676  1.787 2.590 1.208  2.506  19.154 
Post-crisis 
Mean 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.011 0.012  0.052*  0.013 0.004 0.014  0.125  1.220 
SD 0.087 0.085 0.081 0.077 0.081 0.091 0.094 0.088  0.012  0.054 0.048 0.053  0.384  1.452 
Skew 0.690 0.675 0.647 0.607 0.568 0.620 0.813 0.916  -0.043  1.493 1.391 1.265  1.391  3.829 
Kurt 1.886 1.971 2.309 2.332 1.590 1.643 2.537 2.967  1.683  3.370 4.488 2.608  3.562  21.529 
Overall 
Mean 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.020 0.022 0.024  0.037*  0.010 0.004 0.010  0.118  1.819 
SD 0.087 0.089 0.090 0.093 0.095 0.100 0.103 0.103  0.017  0.048 0.045 0.048  0.355  2.478 
Skew 0.679 0.734 0.792 0.697 0.484 0.419 0.594 0.778  0.467  1.178 1.013 0.955  2.065  3.466 
Kurt 3.673 4.501 5.380 4.170 1.761 0.858 1.298 2.033  10.240  3.370 4.633 3.028  9.440  15.319 
* in 100, ** in 1,000 
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In the following analysis we will use periodic changes of returns and implied volatilities. 
They are calculated as 
 
∆(` QOSJ,1 = 2\<ÐD,6.2\<ÐD,6d&2\<ÐD,6d&                ∆(¡J,1 = D,6.D,6d&D,6d&                      (5.2) 
 
In table 5.1 the results show the lowest changes of stock prices during the crisis followed by 
the post-crisis and the pre-crisis. The standard deviations of the changes are highest during 
the crisis. 
 
The changes in implied volatility indicate that the out-of-money calls and out-of-money puts 
have higher volatility than at-the-money options. It can be seen that from the pre-crisis 
through to the crisis and post-crisis periods, the average periodic change increases. Only the 
average changes of the at-the-money options stay nearly constant. In this chapter we only 
focus on at-the-money implied volatilities. 
 
Another attribute which we consider is the daily traded volume	Óº of the underlying 
stock. This value is defined as the cumulated volume of all single trades during the day. It can 
be seen that the highest average periodic change and standard deviation can be seen before 
and after the crisis. 
 
The	put/call	ratio	is calculated by dividing the cumulated number of traded puts by the 
cumulated number of traded calls at the end of each day. 
 
F ⁄ 	O  = 	 ^G\	Á	\IHH	2J
^G\	Á	\IHH	IÏÏJ                                               (5.3) 
 
In table 5.1 the results show that the change of the put/call ratio has the highest value pre-
crisis followed by the crisis and post-crisis periods. The standard deviation of this variable 
shows the same behavior. 
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5.4 Empirical Performance and Discussion 
 
In the section we focus on two liquidity measures. The first is Stock Liquidity Measure (SLM) 
which is based on volume-weighted bid-ask spreads. We received these data from the 
Deutsche Börse who provide them under the name "Xetra Liquidity Measure" (XLM). The 
second is the Market Liquidity Measure (MLM). This is defined as an equally weighted cross 
sectional average over the SLMs33. 
 
@@ = _Wv∑ @<,Wv<_ 	                                                           (5.4) 
 
We use the MLM based on the research by Chordia et al. (2000). They find that when 
liquidity risk is analyzed, not only single stock liquidity but also market liquidity risk should 
be considered. Therefore we subdivide liquidity risk into idiosyncratic liquidity risk measured 
by the SLM and systematic liquidity risk measured by the MLM. Idiosyncratic liquidity risk 
means that changes in single stock liquidity are triggered mainly by its own specifics. In 
contrast, systematic liquidity risk is when single stock liquidity is more affected by a 
common movement of market liquidity. In the following we analyze if idiosyncratic liquidity 
or systematic liquidity risk can better explain implied volatility changes. 
 
The following regression formula (5.5) is calculated without considering liquidity. Based on 
the results we want to identify the interaction between the independent variables and the at-
the-money implied volatility. This helps us to identify later if the MLM or the SLM can 
better explain implied volatility changes. As is common in regressions we use periodic 
changes of all data to have more stationary data. 
 
∆(¡J,1 = ¦´ + ¦_∆(¡J,._1 + ¦W∆(` QOSJ,1 + ¦v∆(ÓºJ,1 + ¦u∆(F ⁄ 	O J__,1 + ¢    (5.5) 
 
In the formula, the variables ∆(¡J,1 and	∆(¡J,._1 contain the daily periodic changes of 
implied volatility and lagged implied volatility of stock	M. The variable 	∆(` QOSJ,1 stands 
for periodic changes of stock prices. Additionally we add the control variables ∆(ÓºJ,1 
and	∆(F ⁄ 	O J,1. The daily trading volume accounts for transaction based liquidity as 
                                                          
33
 This can be done, in our opinion, because of the homogeneity of the stocks listed in the Dax. 
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mentioned by Kalodera and Schlag (2004). They mention that with increasing trading volume 
option liquidity increases. The bQ 	/	LPP	O  is a common measure on the option side for 
trading activity and liquidity. 
 
The results can be found in table 5.2. There, lagged implied volatility shows significant 
behavior, indicating an autocorrelation in implied volatilities. Also, the return changes of 
96%34 represent significant behavior. All beta values are negative, which means that 
decreasing returns result in increasing implied volatilities. This is also described by Smales 
(2012). In the paper by Ammann (2010) they show that lagged implied volatility can be used 
to predict stock market returns. 
                                                          
34
 The value is equal to the sum of all significant single stocks divided by the total number of stocks (overall 23 
stocks). A single stock is significant based on a confidence level of 90%. 
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Table 5.2: Basic regression without liquidity 
To following table is calculated by using regression formula 5.5. The intention is to detect the impact of different attributes on implied volatility. In the regression, liquidity risk is 
neglected. 
 
Panel A: Without Liquidity 
Parameter Estimates 
  W Adj. W  lag IV Returns DTV P/C ratio**** 
ADIDAS AG O.N. 0.1308 0.1276  -0.2856 *** -0.7787 *** -0.0041 -0.0062 
ALLIANZ SE VNA O.N. 0.2368 0.2340  -0.2459 *** -1.407 *** 0.0122 ** -1.2616 
BASF AG O.N. 0.1544 0.1513  -0.2886 *** -1.0504 *** 0.0106 ** 0.3139 
BAY.MOTOREN WERKE AG ST 0.1540 0.1509  -0.2667 *** -0.8722 *** 0.0071 * -0.5389 
BAYER AG  NA 0.1276 0.1244  -0.2483 *** -1.0124 *** 0.0106 ** -0.0054 
COMMERZBANK AG O.N. 0.1983 0.1954  -0.2694 *** -1.0393 *** 0.02 *** 0.1325 
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. 0.1644 0.1613  -0.2943 *** -0.9625 *** 0.0017 -0.2052 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. 0.2079 0.2050  -0.2305 *** -1.2394 *** 0.0122 ** -0.1615 
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. 0.1646 0.1615  -0.2938 *** -0.6817 *** 0.0178 *** 0.0836 
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. 0.1119 0.1086  -0.2972 *** -0.6866 *** -0.0073 -0.1848 
DT.TELEKOM AG NA 0.1120 0.1087  -0.27 *** -0.8505 *** 0.0264 *** 0.9136 
FRESEN.MED.CARE AG O.N. 0.1247 0.1214  -0.3207 *** -0.9093 *** 0.0083 -0.0017 
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO 0.1171 0.1137  -0.2615 *** -0.9336 *** 0.0061 -0.003 
LINDE AG O.N. 0.0375 0.0340  -0.1633 *** -0.5637 *** 0.0117 * -0.3741 
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. 0.2071 0.2042  -0.3135 *** -1.2766 *** 0.0062 0.0086 
MAN AG ST O.N. 0.1219 0.1187  -0.3086 *** -0.4957 *** 0.0155 *** -0.0904 
METRO AG ST O.N. 0.0698 0.0664  -0.232 *** -0.7574 *** 0.0149 ** 0.0158 
MUENCH.RUECKVERS.VNA O.N. 0.1975 0.1945  -0.252 *** -1.5984 *** 0.0056 0.003 
RWE AG ST O.N. 0.1206 0.1174  -0.3169 *** -0.773 *** 0.0252 *** -0.0698 
SAP AG O.N. 0.1578 0.1547  -0.309 *** -1.7197 *** 0.0114 * 0.1178 
SIEMENS AG NA 0.1752 0.1722  -0.2348 *** -1.1005 *** 0.0106 ** -1.3678 
THYSSENKRUPP AG O.N. 0.0989 0.0956  -0.3104 *** -0.1676 * 0.0006 0.0078 
VOLKSWAGEN AG ST O.N. 0.0167 0.0131  0.0139 -0.0831 0.0104 *** -0.0934 ** 
* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99% , **** in 1,000       
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The results of the ∆(ÓºJ,1 indicate overall that with increasing trading volume implied 
volatility also rises. This is in line with the observations by Kalodera and Schlang (2004) and 
Cho and Engle (1999). They detect a relationship between stock market activity, measured by 
the transaction volume, and option liquidity. With 65%34 the stocks showed significant 
behavior. It can be seen that financial institutions like Commerzbank or Deutsche Bank and 
the Deutsche Börse are especially significant. This is because after the Lehman default world 
financial markets were unsure which institution could be hit next. The increasing uncertainty 
is therefore reflected in implied volatility and higher option prices. 
 
The	bQ 	/	LPP	O  shows the lowest significance in the first regression. Also the prefix is 
mixed positive and negative which indicates that implied volatility is affected differently by 
this ratio. 
 
In the following regressions we want to analyze what impact stock liquidity has on implied 
volatility. Therefore the basic regression formula (formula 5.5) is extended by integrating 
either the SLM or MLM. Additionally we subdivide the complete observation period into 
pre-crisis (11.17. 2005 – 08.29.2008), crisis (09.01.2008 – 12.30.2009) and post-crisis 
(01.04.2010 – 09.30.2010) periods. The intention is to identify the impact liquidity has on 
implied volatility during the financial crisis in 2008. By doing this we follow the research 
suggestion paper by Chordia et al. (2000). They mention that it would be interesting to 
analyze how liquidity commonality changes over time.  
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Figure 5.2: Mean spreads of pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
MLM in bps by considering different trading volumes and the following market situations: pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods. The different trading volumes are: 25 (Vol. 1), 50 (Vol. 2), 100 (Vol. 3), 250 (Vol. 4), 500 thousand (Vol. 5)and 1 
(Vol. 6), 2 (Vol. 7) and 3 million (Vol. 8). 
 
 
 
 
In figure 5.2 it can be seen that the MLM (resp. average SLM) is available for different 
traded volumes. On one side, we do not want to use the smallest trading volume because 
liquidity risk is not critical for an investor in this case. On the other side, fewer trades are 
made with higher traded volumes. Based on that, the impact of single trades on the SLM 
(resp. MLM) increases, which can distort the measure. Therefore we choose volume 4 which 
is equal to 250 thousand traded volume. 
 
∆¡ = ¦´ + ¦_∆¡._ + ¦W∆` QOS + ¦vÓÍ\	Ð\<J<J∆@ + ¦vÓÐ\<J<J∆@ +
¦vÓI\	Ð\<J<J∆@ + ¦v∆Óº + ¦s∆F ⁄ 	O  + ¢                                         (5.6)   
 
∆¡ =
¦´ + ¦_∆¡._ + ¦W∆` QOS + ¦vÓÍ\	Ð\<J<J∆@@ + ¦vÓÐ\<J<J∆@@ +
¦vÓI\	Ð\<J<J∆@@ + ¦v∆Óº + ¦s∆F ⁄ 	O  + ¢                                        (5.7) 
 
First we look at the results of the SLM regression formula (formula 5.6). The results are 
presented in table 5.3. Overall it can be said that the average adjusted W value increases from 
Vol. 1 Vol. 2 Vol. 3 Vol. 4 Vol. 5 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 Vol. 8
Pre-crisis 7.63 8.58 10.55 16.77 26.85 44.30 72.98 100.29
Crisis 12.22 15.19 20.96 37.16 63.47 115.63 226.69 349.25
Post-crisis 6.84 7.88 9.79 14.66 22.00 37.77 74.11 111.02
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0.136 (without liquidity) to 0.143 (with SLM)35. This shows that changes in implied volatility 
can be better explained by also considering the SLM. The effect is based on idiosyncratic 
liquidity risk. 
                                                          
35
 On single stock level 22 out of 23 stocks (96%) show an increase of the adjusted RW value. 
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Table 5.3: Impact of SLM on implied volatility 
The impact of stock liquidity (SLM) on implied volatility is calculated by using regression formula 5.6. The results show which impact idiosyncratic liquidity risk has on implied 
volatility. 
 
Panel B: SLM 
Parameter Estimates 
  W Adj. W  lag IV Returns Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis DTV P/C ratio**** 
ADIDAS AG O.N. 0.1376 0.1320  -0.2839 *** -0.7245 *** -0.0254 * 0.0628 * 0.0328  -0.0046  -0.0067  
ALLIANZ SE VNA O.N. 0.2437 0.2389  -0.249 *** -1.2951 *** 0.0537 ** 0.0697  0.0623  0.0154 *** -1.3109  
BASF AG O.N. 0.1721 0.1668  -0.288 *** -0.8745 *** 0.0278  0.0817  0.1841 *** 0.0136 ** 0.3283  
BAY.MOTOREN WERKE AG 0.1632 0.1578  -0.2699 *** -0.811 *** 0.0399 ** 0.059 * 0.0454  0.0107 ** -0.5353  
BAYER AG  NA 0.1509 0.1455  -0.2439 *** -0.9383 *** 0.0342 * 0.2064 *** 0.0409  0.0126 *** 0.0024  
COMMERZBANK AG O.N. 0.2279 0.2229  -0.271 *** -0.8866 *** 0.0149  0.279 *** 0.0214  0.0214 *** 0.3292  
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. 0.1753 0.1700  -0.294 *** -0.8611 *** -0.0054  0.1089 ** 0.1299 *** 0.0038  -0.1313  
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. 0.2161 0.2111  -0.2322 *** -1.1395 *** 0.04 * 0.1221 *** 0.0421  0.0153 *** -0.1468  
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. 0.1685 0.1632  -0.2892 *** -0.6496 *** -0.0012  0.0345  0.0528 ** 0.0188 *** 0.1172  
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. 0.1161 0.1104  -0.2993 *** -0.6476 *** 0.0019  0.0833 ** 0.0005  -0.0071  -0.1711  
DT.TELEKOM AG NA 0.1214 0.1158  -0.2727 *** -0.7089 *** 0.0584  0.0735  0.1311 *** 0.0286 *** 0.897  
FRESEN.MED.CARE AG O.N. 0.1426 0.1368  -0.3149 *** -0.7714 *** 0.0096  0.1356 *** 0.1343 ** 0.0105  -0.0012  
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO 0.1256 0.1197  -0.2621 *** -0.891 *** -0.0092  0.0466  0.0639 ** 0.0061  -0.0025  
LINDE AG O.N. 0.0411 0.0350  -0.1634 *** -0.5201 *** -0.0121  0.0892 * -0.0146  0.0105  -0.3843  
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. 0.2109 0.2058  -0.3138 *** -1.2142 *** 0.0222  0.0679 * 0.0114  0.0075  0.0093  
MAN AG ST O.N. 0.1279 0.1223  -0.3108 *** -0.4498 *** -0.0089  0.0948 ** 0.0453  0.0152 *** -0.0938  
METRO AG ST O.N. 0.0734 0.0674  -0.2304 *** -0.677 *** 0.0303  0.1076  0.053  0.0177 ** 0.0175  
MUENCH.RUECKVERS.VNA O.N. 0.2063 0.2012  -0.2571 *** -1.4651 *** 0.0263  0.0706  0.1023 *** 0.0085 * 0.0703  
RWE AG ST O.N. 0.1298 0.1242  -0.3215 *** -0.6122 *** -0.0045  0.1258 * 0.1931 *** 0.0283 *** -0.0779  
SAP AG O.N. 0.1658 0.1605  -0.3127 *** -1.5934 *** 0.0741 ** 0.0505  0.1035 * 0.0173 ** -0.0184  
SIEMENS AG NA 0.1908 0.1856  -0.2437 *** -0.9721 *** -0.0182  0.1256 *** 0.1397 *** 0.012 ** -1.5918  
THYSSENKRUPP AG O.N. 0.0994 0.0937  -0.3101 *** -0.1713 * -0.013  0.0051  0.0055  0  0.0084  
VOLKSWAGEN AG ST O.N. 0.0222 0.0159  0.0171  -0.0939  0.0617 ** -0.0276  0.0024  0.0113 *** -0.0727 ** 
* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99% , **** in 1,000          
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The detailed results indicate that the lagged implied volatility and returns have a significant 
behavior. This is in line with the results already presented in table 5.2. The prefix for the 
return changes are, as expected, negative again. 
 
By looking at the results of the dummy SLM variables, a different behavior can be seen. The 
significance pre-crisis is around 30%36. During the crisis the value increases to 56%36 and 
drops afterwards to 43%36. This shows that the impact of liquidity becomes stronger during 
the 2008 financial crisis. The betas of the pre-crisis variables show mixed positive and 
negative prefixes. During the crisis this changes. Now all prefixes are positive, indicating that 
with a step up of illiquidity (increasing SLM measure) implied volatility is also higher. The 
average value of the beta increases from 0.02 to 0.09. This is in line with observations by 
Chou et al. (2011) where they mention that a reduction in stock liquidity results in an 
ascending implied volatility curve. In the paper by Cetin et al. (2004) they argue that this 
increased volatility is based on hedging transactions. Given the uncertainty of a crisis, 
investors seek to hedge against potential market declines and therefore buy protection. In the 
paper by Christoffersen et al. (2012) they mention that a shock to a stock's illiquidity results 
in higher option prices. This would also be reflected in increasing implied volatility. After the 
crisis, the betas are still positive overall but the average value changes from 0.09 to 0.06. An 
increase of the SLM measure has therefore a lower impact on implied volatility. Based on the 
results we can demonstrate that idiosyncratic liquidity risk has an impact on implied volatility 
and changes over time. The highest impact appears during the crisis. 
 
The results of the control variables ∆(ÓºJ,1 and ∆F ⁄ 	O  are close, as described 
previously. The daily traded volume, at 65%36, demonstrates significant behavior. The beta is 
positive overall, in line with the observation by Kalodera and Schlang (2004). Increasing 
market trading activity results in increasing implied volatility. On the other side, the put/call 
ratio shows only one significant stock. The prefixes of the betas are mixed positive and 
negative. 
 
                                                          
36
 The value is equal to the sum of all significant single stocks divide by the total number of stocks (overall 23 
stocks). A single stock is significant based on a confidence level of 90%. 
 
Chapter Five: Liquidity Commonality and Option Prices 
85 
 
In the following section we focus on the impact of the MLM on implied volatility changes. 
The results can be found in table 5.4. By looking at the average W value it can be seen that 
by substituting the SLM with the MLM this value changes from 0.143 (with SLM) to 0.150 
(with MLM)37. This shows that systematic liquidity risk (MLM) better explains implied 
volatility changes than idiosyncratic liquidity risk (SLM). We further investigate this point by 
looking at the detailed results. 
                                                          
37
 On single stock level 21 out of 23 stocks (91%) show an increase of the adjusted W value. 
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Table 5.4: Impact of MLM on implied volatility 
By using regression formula 5.7 we analyze what impact market liquidity (MLM) has on implied volatility. The MLM is an indicator for systematic liquidity risk. 
 
Panel C: MLM 
Parameter Estimates 
  W Adj. W  lag IV Returns Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis DTV P/C ratio**** 
ADIDAS AG O.N. 0.1546 0.1492  -0.2839 *** -0.5671 *** -0.0058  0.258 *** 0.158 *** -0.0046  -0.0082  
ALLIANZ SE VNA O.N. 0.2492 0.2444  -0.2519 *** -1.2486 *** 0.04  0.207 *** 0.1453 ** 0.0114 ** -1.3613  
BASF AG O.N. 0.1814 0.1762  -0.2885 *** -0.8276 *** 0.0467  0.1921 *** 0.2703 *** 0.0099 * 0.2994  
BAY.MOTOREN WERKE AG ST 0.1667 0.1614  -0.268 *** -0.7609 *** 0.0297  0.135 *** 0.123 ** 0.0062  -0.5611  
BAYER AG  NA 0.1597 0.1544  -0.2426 *** -0.8565 *** 0.0341  0.3175 *** 0.1234 ** 0.009 ** -0.0047  
COMMERZBANK AG O.N. 0.2130 0.2079  -0.2792 *** -0.9328 *** 0.0481  0.3046 *** 0.0279  0.0198 *** 0.2074  
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. 0.1810 0.1758  -0.2928 *** -0.789 *** 0.0436  0.2504 *** 0.1471 ** 0.0013  -0.0801  
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. 0.2180 0.2130  -0.2422 *** -1.1314 *** 0.0378  0.2023 *** 0.1051  0.0116 ** -0.1533  
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. 0.1806 0.1753  -0.2954 *** -0.5674 *** -0.008  0.1967 *** 0.1565 *** 0.0174 *** 0.0842  
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. 0.1256 0.1200  -0.2979 *** -0.5054 *** 0.0361  0.2486 *** 0.0772  -0.0077 * -0.156  
DT.TELEKOM AG NA 0.1218 0.1162  -0.2723 *** -0.6013 *** 0.0553  0.2301 *** 0.087  0.0258 *** 0.7945  
FRESEN.MED.CARE AG O.N. 0.1515 0.1458  -0.3168 *** -0.6295 *** 0.0453  0.4108 *** 0.0745  0.0049  0.0005  
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO 0.1389 0.1331  -0.2608 *** -0.7221 *** 0.0038  0.2342 *** 0.1455 ** 0.0058  -0.0035  
LINDE AG O.N. 0.0510 0.0449  -0.1621 *** -0.3167 * 0.0839 * 0.2387 *** 0.135 * 0.012 * -0.3322  
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. 0.2150 0.2099  -0.314 *** -1.1536 *** 0.0349  0.1605 *** 0.0655  0.0051  0.0102  
MAN AG ST O.N. 0.1307 0.1252  -0.3087 *** -0.4064 *** 0.0061  0.1656 ** 0.1274 * 0.0151 *** -0.0892  
METRO AG ST O.N. 0.0755 0.0695  -0.232 *** -0.5755 ** 0.0713  0.1389  0.2183 * 0.0156 ** 0.0178  
MUENCH.RUECKVERS.VNA O.N. 0.2085 0.2035  -0.2561 *** -1.4108 *** 0.041  0.1365 ** 0.1691 *** 0.0053  0.0787  
RWE AG ST O.N. 0.1340 0.1284  -0.3183 *** -0.5309 ** 0.0115  0.1805 * 0.3378 *** 0.0248 *** -0.0752  
SAP AG O.N. 0.1645 0.1592  -0.31 *** -1.568 *** 0.0805  0.0975  0.1868 ** 0.0116 * 0.0541  
SIEMENS AG NA 0.2021 0.1970  -0.2348 *** -0.8887 *** 0.0251  0.2486 *** 0.2241 *** 0.0101 ** -1.6158  
THYSSENKRUPP AG O.N. 0.0998 0.0940  -0.31 *** -0.1625 * -0.0259  0.0369  0.0067  0.0002  0.0086  
VOLKSWAGEN AG ST O.N. 0.0501 0.0439  0.0064  -0.0593  0.0125  0.4537 *** 0.0166  0.0094 *** -0.071 ** 
* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99%, **** in 1,000          
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Overall, we see for lagged implied volatility and return changes the same highly significant 
results, as mentioned before. 
 
The dummy regressions show that the rate for significant stocks is around 4%36 pre-crisis and 
increases during the crisis to 86%36. In the post-crisis period the value decreases to 65%36. It 
is also worth mentioning that significance rose during the crisis (using a 99% confidence 
level) from 22% (with SLM) to 74% (with MLM). This shows that not only are the number 
of significant stocks increasing but also the significance itself. The results of the betas are 
positive overall, which is in line with the observations presented in table 5.3. By looking at 
absolute values of the betas we can see that pre-crisis the average value is 0.03. During the 
crisis there is a strong increase of the average value to 0.22 and in the post-crisis period this 
value decreases to 0.14. Also here we can see that MLM changes during the crisis have a 
higher influence on implied volatility changes than before and after the crisis. The detailed 
results confirm our finding that systematic liquidity risk dominates the idiosyncratic one. This 
is in line with the results from Chordia et al. (2000) because the liquidity commonality is 
equal to systematic liquidity risk. 
 
Until now we only focused on a trading volume of 250,000 EUR. In the following section we 
want to analyze the impact of higher and lower traded volumes on the regression results. 
Therefore we calculate regression formula 5.6 and 5.7 by using SLM and MLM of all 8 
trading classes. These are 25 (Vol. 1), 50 (Vol. 2), 100 (Vol. 3), 250 (Vol. 4), 500 thousand 
(Vol. 5) and 1 (Vol. 6), 2 (Vol. 7), and 3 million (Vol. 8) traded volume. 
 
The average W values are presented in figure 5.3. We can see that the MLM displays higher 
overall W values than that for the SLM. The W of regression formula 5.5 without liquidity is 
the lowest. The results indicate that especially from trading volume 5 on the W, values of the 
SLM and MLM values are decreasing. This shows that liquidity risk cannot explain changes 
in implied volatility as well as before.  
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Figure 5.3: Impact of different trading volume 
The following figure represents the average î by using different trading volumes of the SLM and MLM measure. For the 
calculation we used regression formula 5.5 (without liquidity), 5.6 (with SLM) and 5.7 (with MLM). 
 
 
 
 
Going further into detail we look at the result presented in table 5.5. Here we present the 
ratios of significant stocks of the dummy variables35. Overall it can be seen that the highest 
significance for SLM and the MLM is reached during the crisis. Similarly, the value is lower 
pre-crisis and higher in post-crisis times. Besides the pre-crisis period, all results are more 
significant when using the MLM rather than the SLM. This is in line with our results as 
discussed previously. In the paper by Chou et al. (2011) they mention that decreasing spot 
liquidity is linked to an increase of implied volatility. What they do not test is the impact 
different trading volumes have on implied volatility. In their paper they use proportional bid-
ask spreads38. The same is discussed by Christoffersen et al. (2012) where they show that an 
illiquidity premium is reflected in the option price. Their results are in line with our 
observations for lower trading volumes. But by looking at the higher trading volumes we can 
now go further than their research and state that for higher traded volume this link becomes 
weaker. This result becomes clear if we look at the rising SML spreads for higher trading 
volumes in figure 5.2 in the knowledge that trading volume has no direct impact on implied 
volatility. There are other papers like Certin et al. (2006) which integrate the impact of 
                                                          
38
 They use the proportional spreads which are calculated as the difference between closing bid and ask prices 
divided by the average price of the bid and ask. There is no impact of trading volume. 
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liquidity in the basic Black Scholes formula via a supply curve. The supply curve closes the 
gap between trading volume and liquidity costs as with the SLM (respectively XLM). For 
further research, it would be interesting to see how our regression results change by 
calculating the implied volatility based on the new framework as mentioned by Certin et al. 
(2006). 
 
 
Table 5.5: Impact of different trading volumes on implied volatility 
In the following table we use higher trading volumes via the SLM and MLM measure to analyze explanatory power on 
implied volatility changes.  Each value is equal to the sum of all significant single stocks divided by the total number of 
stocks (overall 23 stocks). A single stock is based significantly on a confidence level of 90%. 
 
  Vol. 1 Vol. 2 Vol. 3 Vol. 4 Vol. 5 Vol. 6 Vol. 7 Vol. 8 
SLM 
pre-crisis 17% 17% 26% 17% 17% 13% 4% 4% 
crisis 43% 43% 48% 39% 35% 35% 39% 35% 
post-crisis 26% 35% 43% 43% 39% 17% 22% 17% 
MLM 
pre-crisis 13% 13% 4% 0% 0% 0% 4% 9% 
crisis 87% 87% 87% 83% 83% 74% 65% 57% 
post-crisis 61% 61% 57% 61% 57% 39% 43% 43% 
 
 
Another analytical perspective is to focus on a more granular time-varying liquidity 
commonality. Therefore a one-factor market model is used by Duan and Wei (2009), Cordia 
et al. (2000) and Rösch and Kaserer (2012). The regression is calculated on a monthly basis 
for each stock M. 
 
∆@J = lJ + ¦J∆@@ + ¢J                                                 (5.8) 
 
Based on the W results for each stock M we calculate an equally weighted Liquidity 
Commonality measure () (Rösch & Kaserer, 2012).  
 
 = ∑ J,WWvJ_                                                        (5.9) 
 
The result is presented in figure 5.4. As suspected by Chordia et al. (2000) the commonality 
in liquidity changes over time. 
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Figure 5.4: Commonality of liquidity 
The following chart is calculated on a monthly basis and shows the communality between market liquidity and stock 
liquidity measured by the average W values of regression formula 5.8. Also, to capture the impact of different trading 
volumes we use: 25k (Vol. 1), 250k (Vol. 4), 3m (Vol. 8). 
 
 
 
 
Based on the SLM and MLM data we can see that trading volume has a huge impact on 
commonality. In this chart we use 25k (Vol. 1), 250k (Vol. 4) and 3m (Vol. 8) traded EUR. 
The lowest trading volume shows that pre-crisis and post-crisis commonality is lower than 
during the crisis. This confirms our suggestion that systematic liquidity risk is especially high 
during the crisis. By increasing the trading volume the results show that commonality is 
decreasing during the crisis. Based on that, implied volatility is less affected by bid-ask 
spreads of higher trading volumes. This result is an extension of the work by Cordia et al. 
(2000) where they mentioned this commonality but did not consider different trading 
volumes of the limit order book. The reason for the decreasing result is based on the 
increased risk to the market maker, as mentioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1980). The 
market maker's task is to provide liquidity to the market by buying and selling stocks. 
Between the buy and the sell, the market maker risks making losses. This risk increases with 
greater trading volume, so he requires a reward in the form of a higher bid-ask spread (see 
figure 5.2). The results show that for higher trading volumes, idiosyncratic liquidity is more 
important than systematic liquidity risk. This is contrary to the experience with lower trading 
volume. 
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Finally, we test the robustness of our results. The intention is to show that the discussed 
results can also be found using monthly data of the advanced commonality measure LiqCom. 
Therefore the following regression is calculated: 
 
∆¡ =
¦´ + ¦_∆¡._ + ¦W∆` QOSÓa + ¦vÓÍ\	Ð\<J<J∆ + ¦uÓÐ\<J<J∆ +
¦ ÓÍÁJ	Ð\<J<J∆ + ¦s∆>Óº + ¦!∆F ⁄ 	O  + ¢                                     (5.10) 
 
One characteristic of the W value is the limited range between 0 and 1. This makes the 
measure questionable for a regression. Therefore we make the following transformation as 
performed by Rösch and Kaserer (2012): 
 
R"W =	 Z6½_.Z6½                                                            (5.11) 
 
The W in formula 5.9 is exchanged by the	R". W. 
 
The results can be found in table 5.6. The lagged implied volatility does not show a 
significant result, which demonstrates no significant autocorrelation. Overall, the return 
changes have the same negative prefix and significant behavior. This is in line with our 
results based on regression formulas 5.6 and 5.7.  
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Table 5.6: Liquidity commonality 
In the following table we use the  measure to check the robustness of our results. Therefore we use regression from formula 5.10 and transformation described in formula 
5.11. 
 
Panel A: LiqCom 
Parameter Estimates 
  W Adj. W  lag IV Returns Pre-crisis Crisis Post-Crisis DTV P/C ratio**** 
ADIDAS AG O.N. 0.4603 0.3523  -0.016  -0.815  -0.0163  0.149 *** 0.1335 * 0.1328  0.9673  
ALLIANZ SE VNA O.N. 0.6601 0.5921  -0.0838  -1.6837 *** -0.0311  0.1233 ** 0.079  0.1471  -19.9909  
BASF AG O.N. 0.6380 0.5656  0.0992  -1.6881 *** -0.0141  0.0803  0.0346  0.2582 * -7.5802  
BAY.MOTOREN WERKE AG ST 0.5703 0.4843  0.0249  -1.0462 *** -0.0289  0.0445  0.0262  0.3455 *** -1.2976  
BAYER AG  NA 0.6159 0.5391  0.0972  -1.1664 ** -0.007  0.1421 *** 0.0291  0.1478  0.4606  
COMMERZBANK AG O.N. 0.4571 0.3485  0.0328  -0.3025  -0.0047  0.1511 *** 0.0241  0.1237  -15.0538  
DAIMLER AG NA O.N. 0.6015 0.5217  0.1603  -1.1011 ** -0.0076  0.1551 *** -0.0174  0.398 *** 1.2238  
DEUTSCHE BANK AG NA O.N. 0.5862 0.5034  -0.0096  -0.9461 *** -0.0392  0.165 *** 0.0628  0.209  2.5312  
DEUTSCHE BOERSE NA O.N. 0.3241 0.1890  0.0757  -0.2018  -0.05  0.0993 ** 0.0469  0.1898 * 17.6567  
DEUTSCHE POST AG NA O.N. 0.4553 0.3464  -0.2234  -1.4628 *** -0.0101  0.1103 * 0.1249  0.0129  11.6155  
DT.TELEKOM AG NA 0.5912 0.5094  0.1698  -0.0317  -0.0312  0.1079 ** 0.0455  0.4572 *** 26.7955  
FRESEN.MED.CARE AG O.N. 0.4939 0.3927  0.1531  -1.126 * -0.0104  0.0479  0.0367  0.2634 *** -1.754  
HENKEL AG+CO.KGAA VZO 0.4631 0.3557  0.0361  -0.8879 ** 0.0025  0.1082 *** 0.0867  0.1079  -0.4538  
LINDE AG O.N. 0.5671 0.4806  0.1226  -1.8232 *** -0.0003  0.1183 ** 0.0309  0.2596 * -4.2537  
LUFTHANSA AG VNA O.N. 0.5207 0.4248  -0.0212  -0.8264 *** -0.0058  0.1005 *** 0.0931 * 0.119  1.111  
MAN AG ST O.N. 0.5599 0.4719  0.1967  -0.3472  -0.0003  0.1568 *** 0.0801  0.1025  0.9951  
METRO AG ST O.N. 0.4257 0.3109  -0.044  -0.9235 ** -0.0407  0.0866 * 0.0782  0.1612  -0.9556  
MUENCH.RUECKVERS.VNA O.N. 0.5428 0.4514  0.1362  -2.4382 *** -0.0351  0.2014 *** 0.1104  -0.0924  -17.024  
RWE AG ST O.N. 0.4185 0.3022  0.1441  -0.5681  -0.0257  0.1879 *** 0.029  0.2121  -3.4724  
SAP AG O.N. 0.7424 0.6909  0.0639  -3.0238 *** -0.0493  0.1717 *** 0.0528  0.2434 * -8.479  
SIEMENS AG NA 0.6616 0.5939  0.0856  -1.1809 *** -0.0063  0.1514 *** 0.0826  0.2424 ** -58.5745  
THYSSENKRUPP AG O.N. 0.0728 -0.1126  0.0694  0.2084  0.0293  -0.017  -0.0461  -0.0906  -14.5224  
VOLKSWAGEN AG ST O.N. 0.4781 0.3737  0.1824  -0.2391  -0.0297  0.3145 *** -0.0154  0.0082  -2.2789  
* 90%, ** 95%, *** 99% , **** in 1,000           
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The results of the dummy variables show no significance during the pre-crisis period (0%35). 
During the crisis this value jumps to 83%35 and afterwards drops to 9%35. This is the same 
behavior we could also see in the MLM and SLM regressions (tables 5.3 and 5.4). All betas 
are negative in the pre-crisis, with an average of –0.017. This is contrary to our previous 
results. In the first regressions we had just one or two stocks which showed a negative prefix. 
This mean that with increasing spreads, implied volatility falls. The reason for this misleading 
effect might be the use of monthly data. The betas during and after the crisis were on average 
respectively 0.128 and 0.052. This is in line with the results we found previously. In the 
robustness check the highest betas also appear during the crisis. 
 
In regression formula 5.10 we also integrate the daily traded volume and put/call ratio as 
control variables. The results are in line with the data presented in table 5.3 and 5.4. In 39%35 
of the results, the	Óº shows significant behavior. Also with an overall positive beta, the 
results are in line with the previously mentioned observations. The bQ 	/	LPP	O  still does 
not show any significance and has a mixed positive and negative prefix. 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we analyze the impact of stock liquidity on the implied volatility. We focus on 
23 stocks listed in the Dax over an observation period of around 5 years. To measure liquidity 
we use the single Stock Liquidity Measure (SLM) and Market Liquidity Measure (MLM). 
The measures are based on the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) which is a volume-weighted 
bid-ask spread measure provided by the Deutsche Börse. To determine the impact of the 
financial crisis in 2008 we integrate dummy variables which consider the pre-crisis, crisis and 
post-crisis periods. 
 
Our first result is that stock liquidity plays an important role in explaining at-the-money 
implied volatility changes. Therefore we calculate regressions with and without liquidity and, 
in the first case, we see overall higher average W values. This is in line with the result 
mentioned by Chou et al. (2011). We were able to show that the link is strong, especially 
during the financial crisis in 2008. The reason is that investors hedge their investments as 
mentioned by Certin et al. (2006). 
 
Chapter Five: Liquidity Commonality and Option Prices 
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Based on the paper by Chordia et al. (2000) we analyze the impact of market liquidity on 
implied volatility changes. To measure market liquidity we calculate an equally weighted 
liquidity measure called MLM. The results show that systematic liquidity risk (MLM) is 
better able to explain implied volatility changes than idiosyncratic liquidity risk (SLM). The 
average W increased from 0.143 (with SLM) to 0.150 (with MLM). This relationship is 
especially strong during the crisis. This result indicates that market liquidity should also be 
considered, for example, when designing risk management systems. 
 
Another focus is on different trading volumes. Here we demonstrate that with increasing 
traded volume the explanatory power of implied volatility changes decreases. This result is in 
line with the paper by Certin et al. (2006) and shows that, in particular, the liquidity risk of 
higher traded volumes is not reflected in the option price. Underestimating this risk can lead, 
for example, to higher hedging costs. 
 
Based on the results using the MLM, we analyze further the time varying behavior of liquidity 
commonality. Therefore the  measure is calculated on a monthly basis as described 
by Chordia et al. (2000). The measure shows (especially during the crisis) a co-movement of 
the cross-sectional single stock spreads. This commonality decreases with increasing trading 
volume. We argue that this is based on the increasing risk taken by the market maker as 
mentioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1980). For higher traded volumes, the risk of being 
unable to resell shares is higher. Therefore with increased trading idiosyncratic liquidity risk 
is bigger than systematic liquidity risk. 
 
In the last part of this paper we demonstrate the robustness of our results. For this we use 
monthly data and the advanced liquidity commonality measure	. The results show the 
same behavior. 
 
Chapter Six: General Conclusion 
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Chapter Six 
 
General Conclusion 
 
In this thesis we focus on stock liquidity risk from different perspectives. To measure stock 
liquidity we use the Xetra Liquidity Measure which is calculated by the Deutsche Börse. The 
advantage of this volume-weighted measure is that different trading volumes are taken into 
account. 
 
The aim of chapter three is to test different VaR methodologies which also account for 
liquidity risk. A basic  −  model is proposed by Bangia et al. (1999) and this is the 
starting point of the research. In the first step, we extend the model by integrating advanced 
volatility models like the  − 	 and  − 
. The results show (especially for the 
Dax and MDax) a significant increase in Kupiec back-testing compared to the basic model. 
Within the spread data, we find an autoregressive process which is significant up to lag 5. In 
the next step, we integrate the correlation between spreads and returns into the standard 
 −  and present a new Correlation Liquidity adjusted VaR  −  model. Based on 
our results, we show that the correlation is a time-varying component which is increasing 
during the crisis. We use a Constant Correlation	, Dynamic Conditional Correlation 
Ó and the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average correlation XY@ model. 
Contrary to the basic approach by Bangia et al. (1998), where a perfect positive correlation of 
spreads and returns is assumed, we can demonstrate that overall this assumption is not valid. 
Our argumentation is that liquidity risk is overestimated by simply summing both single VaR 
measures. The results confirm our hypothesis by reducing the number of back-testing results 
where the test is rejected based on an overestimation of risk, while the rate for 
underestimation stays constant. Overall, the results improve around 10%. The overall results 
show that, on one side, the  −  has slightly higher complexity, but on the other side, 
a higher back-testing result. This might help to better manage liquidity risk. 
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Risk management is driven by the fear of unknown events and their impact on the financial 
market. In chapter four we analyze what impact regulatory interventions had on stock market 
liquidity during the financial crisis in 2008. Therefore we focus on the following categories: 
bank liability guarantees, liquidity and rescue interventions, unconventional monetary policy 
and other market interventions. These interventions were aimed at restoring stability to the 
financial market. Based on the test results, different conclusions can be made. Overall, it can 
be said that the market reacts differently to these actions even if they have similar aims: e.g., 
the market reacts positively to liquidity and rescue interventions and negatively to bank 
liability guarantees. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of international interventions on the 
domestic financial markets. In this respect, we find that market interventions triggered from 
abroad have a significant spillover effect on local financial markets. This result shows that 
market interventions should be managed on a global level. Another interesting effect is that all 
stocks within the Dax are closely linked to the reaction of financial institutions within the 
index. Therefore, even portfolios diversified across different industries suffer during the 
crisis. We also examine closely the impact of regulatory interventions on different traded 
volumes. Here the results show that in most cases a significant asymmetry appears. Overall, 
the spreads for lower traded volumes react more strongly than those for higher volumes at the 
announcement date.  
 
In chapter five we analyze the impact of stock liquidity on implied volatility. To measure 
liquidity we use the single Stock Liquidity Measure (SLM) and Market Liquidity Measure 
(MLM). The measures are based on the Xetra Liquidity Measure (XLM) which is a volume-
weighted bid-ask spread measure provided by the Deutsche Börse. To determine the impact of 
the financial crisis in 2008 we integrate dummy variables to enable a focus on the pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis periods.  
 
Our first result is that stock liquidity plays an important role in explaining at-the-money 
implied volatility. Therefore we calculate regressions with and without liquidity and get 
overall higher average W values in the first case. This is in line with the result mentioned by 
Chou et al. (2011). We were able to show that the link is strong, especially during the 
financial crisis in 2008. The reason is that investors hedge their investments, as mentioned by 
Certin et al. (2006).   
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Based on the paper by Chordia et al. (2000) we analyze the impact of market liquidity on 
implied volatility changes. To measure market liquidity we calculate an equally weighted 
liquidity measure called MLM. The results show that systematic liquidity risk (MLM) is 
better able to explain implied volatility changes than idiosyncratic liquidity risk (SLM). The 
average W increased from 0.143 (with SLM) to 0.150 (with MLM). This relationship is 
especially strong during the crisis. These results show that market liquidity should also be 
considered e.g. in risk management systems. 
 
Another focus is on different trading volumes. The results indicate that with increased traded 
volume the explanatory power of implied volatility changes decreases. This result is in line 
with the paper by Certin et al. (2006) and indicates that the liquidity risk of higher traded 
volumes is, in particular, not reflected in the option price. Underestimating this risk can lead 
to higher hedging costs. 
 
Based on the results using the MLM, we analyze further the time varying behavior of liquidity 
commonality. Therefore we calculate the  measure on a monthly basis as described 
by Chordia et al. (2000). The measure shows (especially during the crisis) a co-movement of 
the cross sectional single stock spreads. This commonality decreases with increasing trading 
volume. We argue that this is based on the increasing risk born by the market maker as 
mentioned by Amihud and Mendelson (1980). For higher trading volumes, there is a greater 
risk of being unable to resell shares. Therefore with increasing trading idiosyncratic liquidity 
risk is greater than systematic liquidity risk.     
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Appendix 
1. Appendix for Chapter Three 
Table 1.1: Simulation results based on Dax data by using the Kupiec test 
The following table shows the back-testing results by using the Kupiec test (95% confidence level) in combination with different correlation models and trading volumes. The percentage indicates 
in how many cases the test was not rejected. Overall 23 stocks from the Dax index are considered. The abbreviations are DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation) CC (Constant Correlation) and Corr 
is prefect correlation.  
 
GARCH (Gaussian residuals) GARCH (t - residuals) GJR (Gaussian residuals) GJR (t - residuals) EWMA 
Trade Vol. 50,000 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 EWMA Corr. Corr =1 
Overestimation 9% 9% 13% 9% 9% 13% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 4% 4% 
Correct 91% 91% 87% 91% 91% 87% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 96% 96% 
Underestimation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade Vol. 500,000 
Overestimation 9% 9% 13% 9% 9% 13% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 0% 4% 
Correct 91% 91% 87% 91% 91% 87% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 83% 100% 96% 
Underestimation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade Vol. 3,000,000 
Overestimation 4% 4% 26% 4% 4% 35% 9% 9% 35% 9% 9% 39% 0% 9% 
Correct 96% 96% 74% 96% 96% 65% 91% 91% 65% 91% 91% 61% 96% 91% 
Underestimation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 0% 
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Table 1.2: Simulation results based on MDax data by using the Kupiec test 
The following table shows the back-testing results by using the Kupiec test (95% confidence level) in combination with different correlation models and trading volumes. The percentage indicates 
in how many cases the test was not rejected. Overall 45 stocks from the index Dax are considered. The abbreviations are DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation) CC (Constant Correlation) and Corr 
is prefect correlation. 
 
GARCH (Gaussian residuals) GARCH (t - residuals) GJR (Gaussian residuals) GJR (t - residuals) EWMA 
Trade Vol. 50,000 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 EWMA Corr. Corr = 1 
Overestimation 2% 2% 9% 2% 2% 9% 4% 4% 9% 4% 4% 7% 2% 9% 
Correct 98% 98% 91% 98% 98% 91% 96% 96% 91% 91% 91% 93% 98% 91% 
Underestimation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4% 4% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade Vol. 100,000       
Overestimation 2% 2% 11% 2% 2% 11% 4% 4% 9% 4% 4% 7% 2% 11% 
Correct 98% 98% 89% 98% 98% 89% 96% 96% 91% 89% 89% 93% 98% 89% 
Underestimation 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
Trade Vol. 500,000       
Overestimation 0% 0% 31% 0% 0% 31% 0% 0% 29% 0% 0% 27% 0% 36% 
Correct 93% 93% 69% 93% 93% 69% 93% 93% 71% 84% 84% 73% 91% 64% 
Underestimation 7% 7% 0% 7% 7% 0% 7% 7% 0% 16% 16% 0% 9% 0% 
 
 
Table 1.3: Simulation results based on SDax data by using the Kupiec test 
The following table shows the back-testing results by using the Kupiec test (95% confidence level) in combination with different correlation models and trading volumes. The percentage indicates 
in how many cases the test was not rejected. Overall 23 stocks from the index Dax are considered. The abbreviations are DCC (Dynamic Conditional Correlation) CC (Constant Correlation) and Corr 
is prefect correlation. 
 
GARCH (Gaussian residuals) GARCH (t - residuals) GJR (Gaussian residuals) GJR (t - residuals) EWMA 
Trade Vol. 25,000 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 DCC  CC Corr = 1 EWMA Corr. Corr = 1 
Overestimation 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 17% 0% 0% 26% 0% 0% 26% 0% 26% 
Correct 91% 91% 83% 91% 91% 78% 91% 91% 74% 91% 91% 70% 74% 74% 
Underestimation 9% 9% 0% 9% 9% 4% 9% 9% 0% 9% 9% 4% 26% 0% 
Trade Vol. 50,000 
Overestimation 0% 0% 39% 0% 0% 26% 0% 0% 39% 0% 0% 26% 0% 39% 
Correct 87% 87% 61% 78% 83% 74% 87% 87% 61% 87% 87% 74% 74% 61% 
Underestimation 13% 13% 0% 22% 17% 0% 13% 13% 0% 13% 13% 0% 26% 0% 
Trade Vol. 150,000 
Overestimation 0% 0% 48% 0% 0% 39% 0% 0% 43% 0% 0% 35% 0% 43% 
Correct 78% 78% 52% 65% 70% 61% 78% 78% 57% 70% 65% 65% 78% 57% 
Underestimation 22% 22% 0% 35% 30% 0% 22% 22% 0% 30% 35% 0% 22% 0% 
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Table 1.4: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of Dax stocks 
The table shows fitting results of an AR(0), AR(5) and AR(10) GARCH(1,1) model by using log spread changes and 
different trading volumes. To determine the quality the Akaike AIC19, Bayesian BIC19 criterion and the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) are used. The results are calculated for the Dax, MDax and SDax and by assuming Gaussian distribute 
residuals. 
 
  
Vol 2 Vol 4 Vol 8 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 STD 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
¥ Mean 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 STD 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
GARCH Mean 0.7220 0.8737 0.8642 0.7565 0.8987 0.8972 0.6565 0.8531 0.8423 STD 0.1591 0.0819 0.0870 0.1992 0.0892 0.0809 0.2506 0.1239 0.1374 
ARCH Mean 0.1180 0.0690 0.0716 0.1140 0.0644 0.0658 0.1701 0.0783 0.0813 STD 0.0404 0.0289 0.0306 0.0532 0.0329 0.0304 0.0996 0.0490 0.0484 
AIC Mean -5,596 -5,813 -5,821 -5,390 -5,603 -5,608 -4,976 -5,180 -5,187 
BIC Mean -5,576 -5,769 -5,753 -5,370 -5,559 -5,540 -4,956 -5,135 -5,118 
MLE Mean 2,802 2,915 2,925 2,699 2,810 2,818 2,492 2,599 2,607 
Calculated param. 4 9 14 4 9 14 4 9 14 
 
 
Table 1.5: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of MDax stocks 
The table shows fitting results of an AR(0), AR(5) and AR(10) GARCH(1,1) model by using log spread changes and 
different trading volumes. To determine the quality the Akaike AIC19, Bayesian BIC19 criterion and the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) are used. The results are calculated for the Dax, MDax and SDax and by assuming Gaussian distribute 
residuals. 
 
  
Vol 2 Vol 4 Vol 8 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 STD 0.0006 0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 
¥ Mean 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 STD 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 
GARCH Mean 0.5149 0.8343 0.8141 0.5822 0.8569 0.8420 0.7117 0.8521 0.8391 STD 0.2359 0.1447 0.1677 0.2597 0.1301 0.1510 0.1955 0.1216 0.1445 
ARCH Mean 0.2194 0.0793 0.0822 0.1738 0.0716 0.0736 0.1476 0.0778 0.0795 STD 0.1252 0.0611 0.0625 0.1013 0.0601 0.0607 0.0610 0.0398 0.0414 
AIC Mean -4,800 -5,034 -5,045 -4,616 -4,842 -4,853 -4,305 -4,507 -4,516 
BIC Mean -4,781 -4,989 -4,977 -4,597 -4,798 -4,785 -4,285 -4,463 -4,448 
MLE Mean 2,404 2,526 2,537 2,312 2,430 2,441 2,157 2,263 2,272 
Calculated param. 4 9 14 4 9 14 4 9 14 
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Table 1.6: GARCH fitting results by focusing on log spreads of SDax stocks 
The table shows fitting results of an AR(0), AR(5) and AR(10) GARCH(1,1) model by using log spread changes and 
different trading volumes. To determine the quality the Akaike AIC19, Bayesian BIC19 criterion and the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimator (MLE) are used. The results are calculated for the Dax, MDax and SDax and by assuming Gaussian distributed 
residuals. 
 
  
Vol 1 Vol 4 Vol 6 
AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) AR(0) AR(5) AR(10) 
C Mean -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0002 STD 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
¥ Mean 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001 0.0004 0.0001 0.0001 STD 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
GARCH Mean 0.5847 0.8354 0.8234 0.6451 0.8786 0.8634 0.6207 0.8134 0.8143 STD 0.2382 0.0725 0.1186 0.2399 0.0556 0.0817 0.2577 0.1846 0.1719 
ARCH Mean 0.1786 0.1001 0.0957 0.1652 0.0827 0.0910 0.1503 0.0871 0.0875 STD 0.0522 0.0671 0.0607 0.0663 0.0459 0.0615 0.0512 0.0375 0.0373 
AIC Mean -4,222 -4,475 -4,496 -4,027 -4,229 -4,247 -3,844 -4,014 -4,028 
BIC Mean -4,202 -4,430 -4,428 -4,007 -4,184 -4,179 -3,824 -3,970 -3,959 
MLE Mean 2,115 2,246 2,262 2,017 2,123 2,138 1,926 2,016 2,028 
Calculated param. 4 9 14 4 9 14 4 9 14 
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2. Appendix for Chapter Four 
Table 2.1: Selected events from the FED timeline 
This table is based on the FED crisis timeline published by the FED. The various regulatory interventions are listed 
chronologically, starting in Sept. 2008. Furthermore, the events are subdivided into the following groups: Bank liability 
guarantees, Liquidity and rescue interventions, Unconventional monetary policy, and Other market interventions. 
Events Category Date Country Act 
1 Bank Liability 
Guarantees 10.23.08 
Canada Canadian Lenders Assurance Facility announced to guarantee debt up to three years 
    10.31.08 Germany SoFFin provides Hypo Real Estate with an additional EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
    11.05.08 Switzerland Deposit insurance increased to CHF 100     
    12.03.08 Germany SoFFin provides BayernLB with EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
    
12.15.08 
United 
Kingdom 
Credit Guarantee Scheme guarantee lengthened to five years    
    12.22.08 Germany SoFFin provides IKB with EUR 5 billion in guarantees    
    04.02.09 Sweden Guarantee scheme extended until end of October     
    04.14.09 Germany SoFFin extends EUR 52 billion in guarantees to Hypo Real Estate until mid-August    
    07.03.09 Germany IKB receives an additional EUR 7 billion in guarantees      
    07.31.09 Italy Banco Popolare becomes the first bank to use the Italian bank liability guarantee program    
    09.09.09 Germany Commerzbank announces it will return all of its unused debt guarantees     
    10.08.09 Sweden Guarantee scheme extended an additional six months to April 30th     
          
2 Liquidity and Rescue 
Interventions 10.16.08 
Switzerland Government injects CHF 6 billion into UBS and creates an SPV to buy illiquid assets, funded 
by UBS capital and a central bank loan 
    10.28.08 Sweden Carnegie liquidity facility increased to SEK 5 billion 
    11.10.08 Sweden Carnegie seized by the government, as collateral on the liquidity facility that cannot be repaid  
    
11.28.08 
Germany BayernLB receives EUR 7 billion of capital from Bavaria, requests 3 billion more from 
SoFFin    
    
01.08.09 
Germany SoFFin gives another EUR 8.2 billion of loans to Commerzbank, and buys 1.8 billion worth 
of equity   
    01.15.09 Ireland Anglo Irish bank nationalized due to weak funding position and “unacceptable practices”  
    02.11.09 Ireland New terms for recapitalization for two banks announced    
    02.24.09 Germany Two German states recapitalize the state-owned HSH Nordbank    
    02.25.09 Italy EUR 12 billion recapitalization plan approved     
    03.17.09 Japan Bank of Japan announces a subordinated loan program of JPY 1 trillion   
    03.30.09 Germany SoFFin purchases 8.7% of Hypo Real Estate for EUR 60 million    
    
04.07.09 
Ireland Government announces it will swap government bonds for EUR 90 billion face value of 
toxic assets    
    04.09.09 Germany SoFFin makes a bid for Hypo Real Estate, will nationalize if investors do not accept by May    
    
06.03.09 
Germany Hypo Real Estate shareholders, led by SoFFin at 47% ownership, vote for a EUR 3 billion 
capital injection giving government full control   
    
07.10.09 
Germany Bad bank plan passed by legislature: trades toxic assets for guaranteed debt, but firms must 
repay any losses over 20 year period   
    07.30.09 Ireland Bad bank draft proposal released, legislative debate to begin mid-September     
    
08.20.09 
Switzerland Government converts its stake in UBS to shares and sells them, in addition to a cash payment 
from UBS in lieu of coupon payments   
    
10.06.09 
France Societe Generale follows BNP Paribus, announcing a rights handover to repay government 
aid    
    
11.03.09 
United 
Kingdom 
Lloyds exits the Asset Protection Scheme for a fee; RBS will continue participating under 
new conditions   
    12.14.09 Ireland Finance Ministry announces EUR 10 billion will be made available for recapitalization   
    12.21.09 Ireland Subject to shareholder vote, three banks will receive EUR 5.5 billion in preference shares    
          
3 Other Market 
Interventions 10.15.08 
Switzerland Central bank will begin issuing its own debt to absorb excess liquidity    
    02.02.09 Switzerland Central bank will now also issue debt denominated in USD    
    
04.06.09 
ECB, U.K., 
Japan, 
Switzerland 
Foreign central banks agree to provide the Federal Reserve with foreign currency liquidity  
    
06.25.09 
ECB, U.K., 
Sweden, 
Switzerland 
Swap lines with the Federal Reserve extended until February 1st   
    07.15.09 Japan Swap line with the Federal Reserve extended until February 1st    
    
12.17.09 
Sweden Government announces it will purchase SEK 15 billion against EUR, in foreign exchange, 
given a historically weak krona   
          
4 Unconventional 
Monetary Policy 01.22.09 
Japan Bank of Japan will purchase JPY 3 trillion of CP and asset-backed CP    
    
03.05.09 
United 
Kingdom 
Asset Purchase Plan increased to GBP 75 billion, will include purchases of gilts    
    03.18.09 Japan Purchases of Japanese government bonds increased to JPY 1.8 trillion per month    
    
06.08.09 
United 
Kingdom 
Asset purchases to be expanded to include secured commercial paper    
    
08.06.09 
United 
Kingdom 
Asset purchase plan increased to GBP 175 billion in assets     
    
11.05.09 
United 
Kingdom 
Asset purchase plan increased to GBP 200 billion in assets     
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Events Category Date Country Act 
    03.17.10 Japan Bank of Japan expands fixed rate loans to JPY 20 trillion from JPY 10 trillion     
          
5 Bank Liability 
Guarantees 10.31.08 
Germany SoFFin provides Hypo Real Estate with an additional EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
    12.03.08 Germany SoFFin provides BayernLB with EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
    12.22.08 Germany SoFFin provides IKB with EUR 5 billion in guarantees    
    04.14.09 Germany SoFFin extends EUR 52 billion in guarantees to Hypo Real Estate until mid-August    
    07.03.09 Germany IKB receives an additional EUR 7 billion in guarantees      
    09.09.09 Germany Commerzbank announces it will return all of its unused debt guarantees     
          
6 Bank Liability 
Guarantees 10.31.08 
Germany SoFFin provides Hypo Real Estate with an additional EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
  (only SoFFin events) 12.03.08 Germany SoFFin provides BayernLB with EUR 15 billion in guarantees    
    12.22.08 Germany SoFFin provides IKB with EUR 5 billion in guarantees    
    04.14.09 Germany SoFFin extends EUR 52 billion in guarantees to Hypo Real Estate until mid-August    
          
7 Liquidity and Rescue 
Interventions 11.28.08 
Germany BayernLB receives EUR 7 billion of capital from Bavaria, requests 3 billion more from 
SoFFin    
    
01.08.09 
Germany SoFFin gives another EUR 8.2 billion of loans to Commerzbank, and buys 1.8 billion worth 
of equity   
    02.24.09 Germany Two German states recapitalize the state-owned HSH Nordbank    
    03.30.09 Germany SoFFin purchases 8.7% of Hypo Real Estate for EUR 60 million    
    04.09.09 Germany SoFFin makes a bid for Hypo Real Estate, will nationalize if investors do not accept by May    
    
06.03.09 
Germany Hypo Real Estate shareholders, led by SoFFin at 47% ownership, vote for a EUR 3 billion 
capital injection giving government full control   
    
07.10.09 
Germany Bad bank plan passed by legislature: trades toxic assets for guaranteed debt, but firms must 
repay any losses over 20 year period   
          
8 Liquidity and Rescue 
Interventions 11.28.08 
Germany BayernLB receives EUR 7 billion of capital from Bavaria, requests 3 billion more from 
SoFFin    
  (only SoFFin events) 
01.08.09 
Germany SoFFin gives another EUR 8.2 billion of loans to Commerzbank, and buys 1.8 billion worth 
of equity   
    03.30.09 Germany SoFFin purchases 8.7% of Hypo Real Estate for EUR 60 million    
    04.09.09 Germany SoFFin makes a bid for Hypo Real Estate, will nationalize if investors do not accept by May    
    
06.03.09 
Germany Hypo Real Estate shareholders, led by SoFFin at 47% ownership, vote for a EUR 3 billion 
capital injection giving government full control   
          
9 Short Sell Restrictions  09.19.08 Canada Short sale restriction 
    09.19.08 Ireland Short sale restriction 
    09.19.08 Luxembourg Short sale restriction 
    09.19.08 Switzerland Short sale restriction 
    09.19.08 U.K. Short sale restriction 
    09.19.08 U.S. Short sale restriction 
    09.22.08 Belgium Short sale restriction 
    09.22.08 France Short sale restriction 
    09.22.08 Italy Short sale restriction 
    09.22.08 Netherlands Short sale restriction 
    09.22.08 Portugal Short sale restriction 
    09.24.08 Spain Short sale restriction 
    10.08.08 Norway Short sale restriction 
    10.10.08 Denmark Short sale restriction 
    10.10.08 Greece Short sale restriction 
    10.26.08 Austria  Short sale restriction 
    10.30.08 Japan Short sale restriction 
    07.28.09 Japan Short sale restriction 
          
10 Short Sell Restrictions  09.20.08 Germany Short sale restriction 
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Table 2.2: Test results of abnormal spread and return data with fixed volatility 
This table contains the t-test results for abnormal spread and return changes at the announcement date calculated using 
formula 4.8. The colors indicate significant positive or negative change based on a 95% confidence level.   
 
Dax Volume Return 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Event 1 7.69 8.86 9.59 8.37 5.83 3.93 3.64 3.37 -4.62 
  2 -7.78 -8.6 -7.24 -5.53 -3.82 -2.97 -3.71 -2.25 5.31 
  3 5.81 6.5 7.18 5.66 2.53 -0.42 -0.52 -0.34 -3.68 
  4 2.12 1.89 1.67 2.08 3.27 4.38 2.27 1.4 -1.85 
  5 5.33 6.39 7.07 5.48 3.71 2.54 1.69 0.92 -0.31 
  6 4.85 5.77 6 3.19 1.54 0.57 0.34 0.09 0.8 
  7 1.74 2.24 2.09 1.55 1.06 0.59 -0.01 0.11 -0.56 
  8 2.59 3.43 3.82 3.42 2.54 1.73 1.38 1.76 -2.05 
  9 -18.4 -20.88 -19.13 -16.58 -10.17 -5.85 -3.95 -3.13 9.83 
  10 -0.4 -0.99 -1.43 -1.56 -0.49 0.44 1.47 1.34 -3.37 
 
 
Table 2.3: Test results of abnormal spread and return data with equal volatility 
This table contains the t-test results for abnormal spread and return changes at the announcement date calculated using 
formula 4.8. The colors indicate significant positive or negative change based on a 95% confidence level. 
 
Dax Volume Return 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Event 1 7.94 8.59 9.19 8.42 5.83 3.75 3.41 2.87 -3.96 
  2 -7.32 -8.32 -7.03 -5.53 -3.75 -2.97 -3.77 -1.94 5.00 
  3 4.63 6.51 6.90 5.42 2.36 -0.56 -0.55 -0.28 -4.19 
  4 2.13 1.91 1.68 2.14 3.34 4.33 1.99 1.05 -1.88 
  5 5.57 6.56 7.35 6.09 3.99 2.45 1.48 0.65 -0.48 
  6 5.38 6.34 6.54 3.43 1.44 0.38 0.21 -0.06 0.53 
  7 2.09 2.42 2.18 1.59 0.99 0.51 -0.04 0.22 0.01 
  8 2.92 3.68 3.94 3.50 2.55 1.72 1.39 1.76 -1.68 
  9 -17.39 -17.14 -15.76 -15.73 -11.70 -6.25 -3.87 -3.04 10.04 
  10 -0.69 -1.21 -1.69 -1.67 -0.42 0.50 1.41 1.10 -3.49 
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Figure 2.1: Average spread changes of Dax stocks by considering different traded volumes 
The following table shows the average volume-weighted bid-ask spread changes for different traded volumes39 over the total 
observation period. In addition, the time period is subdivided into pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis periods. 
 
 
                                                          
39
 The different volumes, Vol. 1 – Vol. 8, correspond to 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 thousand and 1, 2, and 3 million traded shares 
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
Vol 1 Vol 2 Vol 3 Vol 4 Vol 5 Vol 6 Vol 7 Vol 8
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis 
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